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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ever-increasing diffusion of institutional ownership is 
reshaping corporate governance at publicly traded companies 
worldwide.1  In line with this global trend, a key structural 
development in recent years has been the growth of institutional 
investors throughout the European Union, where corporate 
ownership and voting are becoming increasingly institutionalized 
and the relevance of other owner categories is decreasing.2  Indeed, 
individual investors directly hold no more than 10-11% of the 
market capitalization, while they held 28% in 1975, and the 
proportion of retail investors among all shareholders is less than half 
the level it was in the 1970s.3  
In spite of the fact that the number of listed companies with a 
controlling shareholder is still fairly high in the EU as well as in 
other areas,4 institutional investors have become the dominant 
 
 
1 See A. DE LA CRUZ ET AL, OWNERS OF THE WORLD’S LISTED 
COMPANIES 5 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Owners-of-the-
Worlds-Listed-Companies.pdf. 
2 Id. at 11 (noticing that “in European listed companies strategic 
individuals and families own 8% of the total market capitalisation; the 
public sector owns 9%; private corporations own 13%; institutional 
investors own 38% and the remaining ownership share corresponds to 
other free-float including retail investors.”). See also OBSERVATOIRE DE 
L’ÉPARGNE EUROPÉENNE [OEE] & INSEAD OEE DATA SERVICE [IODS], 
UNDER THE TENDER: WHO OWNS THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY? EVOLUTION OF 
THE OWNERSHIP OF EU-LISTED COMPANIES BETWEEN 1970 AND 2012, 55 
(2013), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/db5b2604-e1d7-11e5-8a50-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.  
3 See Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital 
Markets Union, at 18, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015). 
4 See Julian Franks, Institutional Ownership and Governance, EUR. 
CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., Feb. 12, 2020, at 5-8, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3530849 (click 
“Open PDF in Browser”). 
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owners of public equity,5 as they “hold 41% of global market 
capitalisation and in advanced economies they have also become 
significant owners in individual companies.”6 
The rise in institutional ownership in the EU has come with a 
significant impact on European issuers’ corporate governance.  
Crucially, institutional investors have grown into prominent players 
in corporate voting.  Indeed, voting turnout at European general 
meetings increased over the last decade,7 chiefly as a consequence 
of institutional investors’ more active engagement with investee 
companies, including voting.8  On EU-average, the level of voter 
turnout increased by some 10% between 2008 and 2018, from 
60.4% to 70.2%, “including an increase of more than one 
percentage point from 2017 to 2018.”9  In many EU Member 
States, such an outcome was driven to a significant degree by the 
 
 
5 Christoph Van der Elst, The Corporate Response to Shareholder 
Activism, 15 ERA F. 229, 231 (2014) (noting that over the last several 
years “large companies in several continental European countries have 
experienced a significant drop in ownership concentration levels,” and 
“the ownership structure of the largest companies became more 
dispersed.”). 
6 DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
7 See European Securities and Markets Authority, Undue Short-Term 
Pressure on Corporations, at 56 (ESMA30-22-762) (Dec. 18, 2019) 
(stating that “evidence collected at national level shows that both the 
attendance and exercise of voting rights in the shareholders’ meeting have 
picked up in certain cases […]. However, this tendency is not consistent 
across countries, mainly due to entrenched and markedly differing sets of 
rules and approaches to holding general meetings which frequently 
provide barriers to foreign shareholder participation in meetings.”).  
8 See Serdar Celik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and 
Ownership Engagement, 2013/2 OECD J. FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93, 94 
(2013), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/institutional-
investors-and-ownership-engagement_fmt-2013-5jz734pwtrkc#page1. 
9 ARNAUD CAVÉ ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC., 
EUROPEAN VOTING RESULTS REPORT 2 (2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/2018_European_Voting_
Results_Report.pdf. 
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mandatory implementation, following the 2007 SRD I,10 of the 
record date regime throughout the Union,11 by enhanced regulatory 
and market pressure on institutional investors and asset managers to 
take on stewardship responsibilities as a part of intermediaries’ 
investment management activities,12 and by the rise of the proxy 
advisory industry.  
Proxy advisory services—particularly proxy analysis and 
voting recommendations—are a cost-effective solution to help 
institutions comply with stewardship and voting requirements.  
Proxy analysis fills information gaps and, for a fee, provides relief 
from the costly and time-intensive work required to gather and 
process the relevant information; voting recommendations 
ultimately provide a cognitive shortcut helping client investors to 
make informed voting decisions and be compliant with regulatory 
requirements that enhance institutions’ stewardship and engagement 
role with investee companies.  More so, the notion that proxy 
advisors wield influence on voting outcomes is widespread in 
 
 
10 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in 
listed companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 [hereinafter SRD I]. 
11 See, e.g., Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholders as Stewarts: 
Evidence of Belgian General Meetings 5 (Fin. Law Inst. Working Paper 
Series, WP 2013-05, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2270938 (assuming 
that the increase in attendance rates at Belgian listed companies’ 2012 
annual meetings “is due to the abolishment of the ‘blocking of shares’”). 
Prior to the SRD I, share blocking during a certain period prior to the 
general meeting, and up to the end of the meeting, was a requirement for 
participation and voting in many Member States. Share blocking was 
found to inhibit institutional shareholder voting since it overly restricted 
the ability to trade shares and was therefore prohibited and replaced by a 
system based on a “record date” (Article 7 of SRD I) under which only 
shareholders of record as of a specified cut-off date in advance of the 
general meeting are entitled to vote, irrespective of whether such 
shareholders will actually still hold their shares on the day of the meeting. 
12 See ARNAUD CAVE ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 2. 
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Europe.13  For example, as far as Italy is concerned, it is especially 
worth noting that the Italian Supervisory Market Authority (Consob) 
found that the effect of proxy advisors on investors’ voting 
regarding say-on-pay is “at least as strong as (and probably stronger 
than) that observed in the US,” consistent with the weight of foreign 
institutions in the shareholder base of Italian listed companies and 
with the features of listed companies in terms of small or medium 
cap firms on a comparative basis.14 
European corporate ownership is also growing ever more 
international, with non-EU shareholders—most of which are 
institutional intermediaries—holding about 44% of the shares issued 
by companies listed in the EU.15  Given that a substantial proportion 
of the shares under foreign ownership is held by large U.S.-based 
investors,16 this factor has, not unpredictably, fueled voting at 
 
 
13 See Eur. Comm'n, Green Paper on The EU Corporate Governance 
Framework, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011); Eur. Comm'n, 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
amending Directive2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-
term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain 
elements of the corporate governance statement, 2, COM (2014) 0213 
final, (2014) 0121 (COD), (Apr. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n, 
Explanatory Memorandum]; EUR. SEC'S MKT. AUTH., AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY. CONSIDERATIONS ON POSSIBLE POLICY 
OPTIONS 17 (ESMA/2012/212, No. 66) (Mar. 22, 2012); EUR. SEC'S MKT. 
AUTH., FINAL REPORT. FEEDBACK STATEMENT ON THE CONSULTATION 
REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY 12 (ESMA 
2013/84) (Feb. 19 2013).  
14 Massimo Belcredi et al., Proxy Advisor and Shareholders 
Engagement. Evidence from Italian Say-on-Pay 26-28 (CONSOB, 
Working Paper no. 81, 2015), ssrn.com/abstractid=2616258. 
15 Eur. Comm'n, Explanatory Memorandum, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 3. See also DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14. 
16 See DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 15, fig 6. Regarding Italy see NADIA LINCIANO ET AL., 2016 
REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES, 13-
14 (CONSOB Statistics and Analyses) (2016), 
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European corporations. In effect, also due to a number of regulatory 
measures adopted over time, U.S.-based institutions have a longer-
standing tradition of being more active voters. 
Within the institutionalized scenario for corporate ownership 
and voting in the EU, the Italian landscape is no exception, in spite 
of concentrated corporate ownership of publicly listed corporations 
and the fact that Italy’s stock market development still lags behind 
other European countries.17  According to the OECD, “[t]he 
proportion of households’ financial assets managed by institutional 
investors has been growing in recent years.”18  If, in 2017, “only 
one-third of Italian households’ financial assets were managed by 
institutional investors compared to 40% in the Euro area and two-
thirds in the United Kingdom,” this is largely because the share of 
household financial assets held by pension funds is low compared 
 
 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947709 (reporting that, at the end of 2015, 
institutional investors were major shareholders in nearly 36% of the 
market, holding on average 6.9% of the share capital in 83 firms; foreign 
institutional investors owned major holdings especially in larger firms and 
in the financial sector). Referred to the UK, see OFF. FOR NAT'L STAT., 
OWNERSHIP OF UK QUOTED SHARES: 2016, para. 3, 5, 11, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/
ownershipofukquotedshares/2016. 
17 At the end of 2018, total market capitalisation decreased by 15 
percent compared to 2017, reaching around 542 billion euros; companies 
listed on the MTA increased slightly, from 237 to 240, as also did those 
traded on the AIM Italia-MAC market, from 95 to 113. See COMMISSIONE 
NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA BORSA (CONSOB), REPORT ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES 2019 5-6 (2020), 
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/report-on-corporate-
governance [hereinafter CONSOB REPORT 2019]. See also ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW OF ITALY 2020: 
CREATING GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES FOR ITALIAN COMPANIES AND SAVERS 
17, 23 (2020), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/OECD-Capital-Market-
Review-Italy.pdf [hereinafter OECD] (noticing that “During the last ten 
years, on average less than four companies per year became listed on the 
regulated market of the Italian stock exchange and the Italian market 
capitalisation as per cent of GDP remains well below that of its European 
peers.”). 
18 OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at  42. 
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to other European peers.19  In fact, private pension plans are merely 
voluntary in Italy, and the public pension system is predominant. 
As regards ownership structure, Consob found that, by the end 
of 2018, 203 out of 231 companies listed on the Italian Stock 
Exchange (accounting for 88% of the total number of publicly listed 
corporations) were controlled companies, and about 77% of which 
were controlled by a single stockholder holding either more than 
half of the share capital (123 companies) or a lower stake (57 
firms).20  Consob also reported that the ultimate controlling agent is 
the family in 152 listed firms, accounting for the 33% of the market 
capitalization; the State (and other local authorities) in 23 large 
companies (37.8% of the market capitalization); a financial entity in 
11 cases (mainly small firms).21 
Non-controlled, widely held companies are thus clearly still 
limited in number, although they grew from 11 in 2010 to 13 in 2018 
(5.6% of the total number of listed firms, representing 20.5% of 
market capitalization).  Concentrated ownership is also an 
explanation for the low free-float ratios in the Italian regulated 
market.22  Ultimately, however, “the differences between the 
concentration level of the Italian listed corporate sector and those of 
France, Germany, and Spain are insignificant.”23  Moreover, the use 
of control-enhancing mechanisms in Italian listed companies 
 
 
19 Id. (emphasizing that “[t]he assets held by Italian pension funds 
account for a modest 9.4% of GDP, which is far below the OECD average 
of 50.7%.”). 
20 See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 13. 
21  Id. at 16. 
22 See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 34 
(illustrating that “[a]t 60%, the Italian stock market has the lowest free-
float ratio among comparable European countries and well below the 
European average of 75%. Moreover, only 29% of the companies listed in 
the Italian regulated market have more than 50% of their shares readily 
available in the market (free float), compared to 41% in France and 45% 
in Germany.”).  
23 Id., at 94. 
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significantly decreased over the last twenty years.24  Indeed, in 2016, 
18.2% of MTA-listed issuers belonged to pyramidal or mixed 
business groups compared to 44% in 1998.25  In addition, while 
nonvoting shares gradually decreased over time,26 three firms have 
provided for a category of multiple voting shares and forty-seven 
issuers have introduced loyalty shares in their bylaws.27 
In line with the trend observed in other countries, despite the 
predominance of controlled companies, institutional investors are 
relevant shareholders in a not-negligible number of Italian listed 
companies.28  As the OECD confirmed, “in Italy, institutional 
investors hold, on average, lower stakes in listed companies 
compared to the global average (41%), but at similar levels with 
many European peers.”29  In fact, institutional investors hold 
relevant stakes in sixty companies listed in Italy, accounting for 
26.9% of the market.30  Noticeably, Italian institutional investors are 
relevant shareholders31 in twelve companies only, whereas foreign 
 
 
24 See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 22. 
25 See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 20. 
26 Id., at 14, 21 (reporting non-voting shares were issued by 14 listed 
companies by the end of 2018, compared to 70 by the end of 1998, and 
120 by the end of 1992).  
27 Id. (showing that “[l]oyalty shares have vested their increased 
voting power (active loyalty shares) in 28 firms, where the leverage and 
the wedge are equal respectively to 1.3 and to 12%”). 
28 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
29 OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 92 (with 
institutional investor ownership weighted by total market capitalization as 
of end 2018 averaging 26.9% in Italy, compared to 27.5% in France, 
28.3% in Germany, 26.5% in Spain, 38.3% in Sweden, 23.1% in Norway, 
and 32.1% in Finland—but 61.0% in the United Kingdom). 
30 Id. 
31 For the purposes of Consob’s statistics, major institutional 
investors are defined as investment funds, banks and insurance companies 
subject to reporting obligations according to Consob rules and whose 
shareholdings are lower than 10%.  
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institutional investors hold relevant stakes in fifty-one companies.32  
In effect, domestic and foreign ownership of publicly listed equities 
evolved along opposite lines over the last decade, with Italian 
institutions’ holdings steadily decreasing since 2011, and 
nonresident institutions’ holdings increasing and stabilizing since 
2015 onwards.33  National and foreign institutional share ownership 
differ also in regard of the size of investee companies and the 
industry they belong to.  Italian institutions tend to more frequently 
concentrate major stakes on small-sized and industrial companies, 
while foreign institutions’ investments rather target large firms and 
the financial industry, with 35% of FTSE MIB firms,34 and 25% of 
financial industry firms, featuring major foreign holdings.35  Such 
 
 
32 CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 19-20. 
33 See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 17 
(illustrating that “[t]he limited size of the Italian market is also reflected in 
the fact that only 7% of the Italian institutional investors’ portfolios were 
invested in corporate shares and bonds issued by Italian firms at the end of 
2017. Instead, Italian investors had directly or indirectly through foreign 
investment funds, allocated around EUR 190 billion to equity investments 
in foreign firms. In terms of value, this sum represents almost two-thirds 
of the total free-float market capitalisation of all Italian listed 
companies.”). 
34 See FTSE MIB, BORSA ITALIANA, 
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsa/indici/indici-in-
continua/dettaglio.html?indexCode=FTSEMIB&lang=en (last visited Mar. 
17, 2020) (“The FTSE MIB is the primary benchmark index for the Italian 
equity markets capturing approximately 80% of the domestic market 
capitalization  . . . The FTSE MIB Index measures the performance of 40 
Italian equities and seeks to replicate the broad sector weights of the 
Italian stock market.”). 
35 CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 19-20. According to further Consob Staff analysis, institutional 
ownership in the 100 largest non-financial companies publicly listed in 
Italy by active national and foreign asset managers (mutual, sovereign, and 
hedge funds) averaged 13.5% over the period 2010-2015 (compared to 
15% in Spain, through to nearly 25% in France and Germany, and up to 
nearly 50% in the UK); see Francesco Fancello et al., Non-bank 
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divergent evolutionary patterns for domestic and foreign 
institutional ownership might possibly be explained by the fact that 
corporate ownership of publicly listed companies in the financial 
industry, especially the banking industry, is radically different from 
that of industrial companies.  At the end of 2014, only six listed 
banks were actually controlled companies, whereas the remaining 
twelve, accounting for 21% of the total market capitalization, were 
either widely held companies or cooperative companies, which 
typically feature one-member-one-vote voting structures.36  In turn, 
dispersed bank ownership was largely a consequence of the 
privatization process the industry underwent over the 1990s, which 
then triggered large-scale acquisitions and mergers.37 
In line with the developments at the EU level, the increasing 
weight of institutional investors within the shareholder base of 
Italian listed companies has been accompanied by a tendency for 
investors to be more active owners.  In 2018, the annual general 
meeting season recorded record highs in terms of the share capital 
represented at the meeting (72.6% on average) and the institutional 
investors’ participation (exceeding 21% of the company’s capital).38  
Over the period 2012-2018, institutional investors’ attendance rates 
grew significantly in terms of the investors attending and the 
percentage of the share capital represented at the meeting.39  
Significantly, foreign institutions have attended the meetings of all 
of the hundred largest Italian companies since 2015; in 2018, they 
cast on average around 29% of the votes.40  More so, in the 2018 
 
 
institutional investors’ ownership in non-financial companies listed in 
major European countries 7-29, (CONSOB, Working Paper No. 86 2018), 
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/wp86.pdf/e12aebb0-3f2c-
45b7-964c-71d0198a8613. 
36 See Angela Ciavarella et al., La corporate governance delle società 
quotate italiane. Focus sul settore bancario [Corporate governance trends 
in Italian listed banks], BANCARIA 82, 82 (It.) (Apr. 2016), 
https://bancaria.it/assets/PDF/2016-04.pdf. 
37 Id. at 84-85. 
38 See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 40-41. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 7. 
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proxy season, institutional investors collectively held a majority of 
the votes cast at the general meetings at one-third of the thirty-five 
most capitalized Italian listed companies.41  Altogether, as noticed 
by Consob, “[l]arger institutional investors or those with a stronger 
stewardship vocation are increasingly active in direct 
communication with companies for a number of issues, including 
corporate governance.  In addition, investors have shown increasing 
interest in issuers' approach to social and environmental issues.”42 
The Italian experience clearly shows that the structure of 
corporate ownership does not necessarily affect shareholder 
engagement with investee companies and that non-activist 
institutional investors can play a major stewardship role also in 
concentrated ownership contexts.  Indeed, institutional investor 
engagement with Italian publicly listed corporations is not only 
focused on a few companies with widely dispersed ownership and 
no one shareholder holding a stake large enough to secure voting 
control but also concerns controlled companies, where a stockholder 
or a coalition of shareholders hold the (absolute or relative) majority 
of the votes.  
Importantly, the Italian case also helps explain how the 
regulatory framework can contribute to create an environment 
favorable to non-activist institutional investors’ active ownership.  
The Italian regime for corporate elections at listed companies is 
particularly illustrative of this aspect.  In fact, the right to appoint 
directors on the board is key to encourage institutional investors’ 
stewardship at controlled companies and has proven to be one of the 
most effective means of ensuring consideration for minority 
interests and enhancing oversight over the controlling shareholders 
or management.   More generally, at Italian companies, institutional 
investors can exercise a wider range of powers granted to the 
shareholders as compared to the powers available to U.S. 
 
 
41 Antonella Olivieri, ‘L’avanzata dei fondi: in Borsa comandano in 
una blue chip su tre’ [The rise of mutual funds: They control one third of 
blue chips], IL SOLE24ORE (It.) (Aug. 4, 2019).  
42 See Annual Report 2018, CONSOB 5, 25 (2019), 
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/ar2018.pdf/cdc8a77f-f096-
4e92-af53-94305683aec9. 
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shareholders.  Institutions can exert pressure on the controlling 
shareholder and the company’s management by exploiting further 
minority shareholder rights provided for under national law, such as 
say-on-pay votes and the enhanced role to be played by the 
shareholders in the context of related party transactions.  
All the above confirms that there is indeed a link between 
shareholders’ rights and institutions’ ability to engage convincingly 
with investee companies regarding corporate governance.  Given 
that, in recent years, controlled companies have been on the rise at 
the international level, partly as a consequence of going public with 
a dual-class structure,43 the issue this Article deals with is of interest 
for many countries, including the U.S., where controlled companies 
“constitute a sizeable minority of large, publicly[-]traded firms.”44     
 
 
43 See Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the 
United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378 (2009); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1660 (2006); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 
43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 119, 119-20 (2015); María Gutiérrez & Maribel 
Sáez Lacave, Strong Shareholders, Weak Outside Investors, 18 J. CORP. L. 
STUD. 277, 281 (2018) (noting that “[a]s controlled firms grow in 
importance, tunneling, self-dealing, and other types of investor 
expropriation could become significant concerns in the US.”). 
44 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and 
Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2017); see also 
Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder 
Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 54-56 (2018); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan 
Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 119, 119-20 (2015); Jens Dammann, The Controlling 
Shareholder's General Duty of Care: A Dogma that Should Be 
Abandoned, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 479, 483 (2015); Edward Kamonjoh, 
Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Follow-up 
Review of Performance & Risk, IRRC INST. 15 (2016), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/controlled-companies-standard-
poors-1500-follow-review-performance-risk/ (reporting that, as of October 
2015, 7% of the constituents of the S&P 1500 index were controlled firms: 
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 Against this backdrop, this Article proceeds as follows.  Part II 
briefly draws the Italian basic corporate governance framework.  
Building on the Italian case, Part III sets the scene by illustrating 
how minority-empowering shareholder rights can contribute to 
creating an environment favorable to non-activist institutional 
investors active ownership.  While acknowledging that not all of the 
many tools introduced by the Italian legislature have proven 
successful in driving increased institutional investor engagement 
with Italian investee companies, it shows that some indeed have, as 
is most notably the case for say-on-pay votes, alongside the record 
date regime with regards to attendance at the shareholder meeting 
and the slate voting system with regards to director elections.  Part 
IV follows up on the previous analysis by reporting some evidence 
regarding the practice of shareholder voting and engagement in 
Italy.  Part V illustrates how the rise in activist, hedge fund-driven 
intervention can impact non-activist institutions’ stewardship role at 
controlled companies.  Part VI sets out some concluding remarks. 
II. SETTING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR-ORIENTED 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE  ITALIAN BASIC 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The basic regulatory framework for shareholder voting and 
engagement in Italy is set by the Civil Code, applicable to any 
corporation, and Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998 
(so-called Consolidated Law on Finance – Testo unico della finanza, 
hereinafter referred to as ‘CLF’), which lays down additional rules 
for publicly listed corporations.  Regulations implementing the CLF 
 
 
“there are two primary control mechanisms in the updated study group: 1) 
multi-class capital structures with unequal voting rights (78 study 
companies); and 2) control through ownership of at least 30 percent of a 
class of single-vote stock by a person or group (27 firms).”). 
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are drawn by Consob, the Italian Financial Markets Supervisory 
Authority.45  
Another distinctive feature of the corporate governance 
framework in Italy and in other European countries is the crucial 
played by soft law.46  As far as Italy is concerned, the Corporate 
Governance Code sponsored by Borsa Italiana, the Italian Stock 
Exchange, provides for nonbinding best practice principles and 
recommendations applicable to publicly listed companies based on 
a comply-or-explain approach that is explicitly endorsed by the 
law.47  In effect, under Article 123-bis(2)(a) CLF, publicly listed 
corporations are required, ahead of the annual general shareholder 
meeting, to publicly file a corporate governance report detailing, 
 
 
45 See Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa (Consob), 
Regulation no. 11971 of May 14, 1999 (Regulation implementing Italian 
Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998, concerning the discipline 
of issuers), http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-and-
regulations/documenti/english/laws/reg11971e.htm?hkeywords=&docid=2
&page=0&hits=21&nav=false [hereinafter Consob Regulation No. 
11971]. Additional rules and regulations relevant to corporate governance 
may also apply, depending on the industry the company belongs to. Most 
noticeably, banks and the parent companies of banking groups are subject 
to a set of rules set by Legislative Decree No. 385 of September 1, 1993 
(so-called Consolidated Law on Banking – Testo unico bancario), as well 
as the Bank of Italy in implementing Circular no. 285 of December 17, 
2013 (‘Disposizioni di vigilanza per le banche’), as subsequently 
amended. Similarly, insurance companies are subject to specific rules 
imposed on them by Legislative Decree No. 209 of September 7, 2005 
(so-called Private Insurance Code – Codice delle assicurazioni private) 
and implementing regulations set by Ivass, the supervisory authority. 
46 Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law 2018 24-26 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst. (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 460/2019, 2019) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421389. 
47 First released in 1999, the Corporate Governance Code was 
updated several times; most recently, the Code underwent major reviews 
following the model of the UK Stewardship Code 2020. The new January 
2020 version of the Italian Code will apply starting in 2021. See CORP. 
GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2020), 
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/comitato-corporate-
governance/codice/2020eng.en.pdf. 
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amongst other things, compliance with the Corporate Governance 
Code, or explaining the reasons for not adopting any of the Code’s 
provisions.  Based on corporate governance reports, 94% of the 
companies listed on the MTA (the leading regulated equity market 
managed by Borsa Italiana for mid and large-size companies48) on 
December 31, 2018 had adopted the then current version of the 
Corporate Governance Code.49  Eleven out of the fourteen 
companies not adopting the Code referred to specific firm 
characteristics—particularly small size and concentrated 
ownership—as an explanation for the determination not to adopt the 
Code. 
Traditionally, the Italian corporate structure is based on the 
shareholder-elected board of directors,50 which may delegate 
managing powers to a executive managing director or an executive 
committee,51 and the board of statutory auditors (collegio 
 
 
48 Borsa Italiana currently manages three equity markets, with 
companies being listed on Mercato Telematico Azionario (MTA) and 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM Italia), and financial vehicles being 
listed on the Market for Investment Vehicles (MIV) and the Partnership 
Equity Markets. As of end 2018, 242 companies were listed on MTA and 
113 on AIM Italia. The MTA market is split into two segments, the 
Standard listing segment and the Star segment, which requires additional 
corporate governance standards to be adopted and is open to companies 
that have less than EUR 1 billion market capitalisation. See OECD, OECD 
CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW OF ITALY 2020: CREATING GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ITALIAN COMPANIES AND SAVERS, 33 (2020), 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/OECD-Capital-Market-Review-
Italy.pdf. 
49 See ASSONIME & EMITTENTI TITOLI, REPORT ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN ITALY: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ITALIAN CORPORATE 




50 See Codice civile [C.c.] [Civil Code] art. 2364 (It.) (laying down 
the decision-making authority of the shareholders meeting, amongst which 
the appointments to the board of directors and the board of statutory 
auditors). 
51 See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2381 (It.).  
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sindacale).  The board of directors thus includes executive and 
nonexecutive members elected for a term of up to three years.52  The 
board of statutory auditors, whose members are elected by the 
shareholders as well, is in charge of overseeing compliance with the 
law and the adequacy of the company’s organizational and 
accounting systems.53  If it is considered that nonexecutive members 
of the board of directors chiefly play a supervisory role, given that 
most of the management functions are delegated to executives, 
Italian listed companies feature a corporate structure which, as a 
matter of fact, owes most of its substantive inspiration to the Anglo-
American one-tier board system, rather than the German two-tier 
system.  The board of statutory auditors cannot be regarded as a 
functional equivalent to the German Aufsichtsrat, since, unlike the 
latter, it lacks any power to interfere with the board of directors’ 
decision making, either strategic or managerial, and are left alone 
the power to appoint the members of the board of directors.  
Following a wide-reaching company law reform enacted in 
2003, a corporation may choose to adopt a one-tier or a two-tier 
management and control system as an alternative to the traditional 
structure, which applies as a default rule unless it is opted out in the 
articles of association.54  Under the one-tier structure, an oversight 
committee is appointed within the shareholder-elected board of 
directors, whose members must be nonexecutive and independent.55  
Under the two-tier structure, a supervisory board is elected 
alongside the management board.  The supervisory board is elected 
by the shareholders, whereas the authority to elect the members of 
the management board is vested with the supervisory board.56  
Additional powers vested with the supervisory board render the 
Italian two-tier system the nearest equivalent  the German model, 
though differences persist.  Despite the availability of such set of 
 
 
52 See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2388 (It). 
53 See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2400, 2403, and 2403-bis (It.). 
54 See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2380, 2409-octies, and 2409-sexiesdecies 
(It.).  
55 See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2409 septiesdecies and 2409-optiesdecies 
(It.). 
56 See C.c. art. 2409-novies and 2409-duodecies. 
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corporate structures, more than fifteen years after reform, the vast 
majority of Italian listed companies have maintained the traditional 
corporate structure.  At the end of 2017, Italian listed companies 
adopting the traditional corporate structure accounted for 91% of the 
market capitalization, with just four firms adopting the one-tier 
structure or the two-tier structure.57  We will, therefore, only refer to 
the so-called traditional corporate structure under which corporate 
power is vested with the board of directors, while the shareholders 
are essentially intended to take on a monitoring role to be backed up 
by the board of statutory auditors.  
The fact that the board of directors is key within the corporate 
structure does not, however, entail the irrelevance of the 
shareholders meeting.  The shareholders meeting actually retains its 
role as the ultimate tool for director accountability, since it holds the 
power, above all, to elect (and remove) the members of the board of 
directors and to approve any amendments to the articles of 
association.58  It should be noted that, within corporate ownership 
structures characterized by the principal-principal agency problem, 
such as those of many Italian listed companies,59 shareholder 
monitoring becomes a matter of minority oversight and minority 
challenges to the authority of the board and the controlling 
stockholders.  Therefore, unsurprisingly, the evolutionary process 
that the national corporate governance regulation underwent 
historically, ever since the enactment of the unified Civil Code in 
1942, through to the 1998 CLF and further subsequent 
developments, including the transposition of SRD I and SRD II,60 
has been a process strongly shaped around the direct and indirect 
empowerment of minority shareholders: whether by enhancing 
 
 
57 See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 17. 
58 See C.c. art. 2364 and 2365 (laying down the decision-making 
powers that rest with the shareholders meeting, either ordinary or 
extraordinary). 
59 See infra Part II. 
60 See Council Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as 
Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 
2017 O.J. (L 132/1) 3 [hereinafter SRD II]. 
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minority shareholder rights and prerogatives, supporting minority 
shareholders’ actual ability and even willingness to exercise those 
rights, or strengthening oversight by the board of statutory auditors 
and further gatekeepers. 
A parallel force shaping corporate governance in Italy is the 
development of financial intermediaries’ regulation, starting from 
reforms enacted in 1974 (which established the Consob as the 
national financial markets supervisory authority) onwards.  With the 
aim of ensuring end-investor protection, intermediaries’ regulation 
has wielded indirect influence on corporate governance.  In a 
context increasingly characterized by intermediated investments, 
regulation has progressively focused on institutional investors as 
owners and has enhanced their oversight role, especially regarding 
voting obligations.61  Regulatory action in this area is further 
supported by self-regulation.  Following the EFAMA Stewardship 
Code,62 first adopted in 2011, Assogestioni, the Italian asset 
managers’ non-profit association, adopted Stewardship Principles in 
2013.  The Italian Stewardship Principles were last revised in 
2016.63  In line with the EFAMA Code, as well as a growing number 
of similar stewardship initiatives, the Italian Stewardship principles 
target collective investment management and portfolio management 
companies with the aim of “promot[ing] discussion and cooperation 
between Investment Management Companies and listed companies 
 
 
61 See infra Part III.A. 
62 See EUR. FUND AND ASSET MGMT ASS’N, STEWARDSHIP CODE. 
PRINCIPLES FOR ASSET MANAGERS’ MONITORING OF, VOTING IN, 
ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTEE COMPANIES (2018), 
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Corporate_Governance/EFAM
A%20Stewardship%20Code.pdf. 
63 MASSIMO BELCREDI & LUCA ENRIQUES, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
ACTIVISM IN A CONTEXT OF CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND HIGH 
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: THE CASE OF ITALY 8–9 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst. (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 225/2013 2014) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325421; See 
ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016), 
https://ecgi.global/code/italian-stewardship-principles-2016 [hereinafter 
ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES 2016].  
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in which they invest,” thereby indirectly impacting listed companies 
“which are called upon to promote dialogue with investors, asset 
managers and their respective advisors,” as well as institutional 
investors “that entrust the management of their assets to third 
parties, and are requested to share with their managers certain 
decisions on how to interact with the investee companies.”64 
As will be shown, by leveraging enhanced shareholder rights 
and further shareholder-friendly regulatory measures,65 
Assogestioni has greatly contributed to shaping the practice of 
institutional investor engagement in Italy.  In particular, the enabling 
and coordinating role performed by the Association actually 
underpins the rise of effective forms of collective engagement by 
mainstream, non-activist institutions,66 thus providing an alternative 
to hedge fund-driven activist intervention, which has become quite 
popular in Italy in spite of the still predominant ownership 
concentration of publicly listed corporations.67 
III. STIMULATING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR VOTING 
AND ENGAGEMENT IN ITALY 
In and of itself, the surge of institutional ownership is not 
enough to stimulate institutional investors to take on a more active 
corporate governance role.  The Italian case clearly shows that 
regulatory factors also contributed to supporting the increase in 
institutional shareholder voting and engagement at publicly listed 
companies. Over the last two decades, Italy gradually reshaped the 
legal framework for participating in shareholders meetings and 
voting so as to craft an engagement-friendly regulatory 
environment.68  In fact, “a number of self-enforcing rules (especially 
 
 
64 Id. at 11. 
65 See infra Part III.A-C. 
66 See infra Part III.D. and Part IV.A. See Gaia Balp & Giovanni 
Strampelli, Institutional Investor Collective Engagements: Non-Activist 
Cooperation vs Activist Wolf Packs, in 14 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 
(forthcoming). 
67 See infra Part V. 
68 See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 7. 
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on voting) and a broader set of minority shareholder rights have 
made today’s Italian legal environment no less friendly to activist 
investors than most other jurisdictions.”69  Enhanced shareholder 
rights and asset managers’ quasi-duty to vote as a part of their 
fiduciary duties to end-investors can be regarded as parallel forces 
driving increased voting in spite of non-activist, traditional 
institutions’ weak incentive structures. 
Soft regulation in the form of corporate governance and 
stewardship principles also contributed support to institutions’ more 
active ownership.  In effect, “provisions strengthening shareholders’ 
rights operate in conjunction with those set by stewardship and 
corporate governance codes that target institutional investors as 
shareholders in order to foster their constructive engagement with 
investee companies as a part of institutions’ investment management 
activities.”70 
A. ASSET MANAGERS’ QUASI-DUTY TO VOTE AND 
INSTITUTIONS’ ENGAGEMENT POLICY 
When analyzing the EU regulatory environment as a supportive 
factor for shareholder voting, one relevant issue to consider is that, 
based on the framework for discretionary portfolio and collective 
investment management, intermediaries are entitled to vote on 
behalf of the shares owned by the funds they manage.  Because of 
this entitlement, according to  Article 21 of Directive 2010/43/EU 
and  Article 37 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 
231/2013, mutual funds and alternative investment funds are 
required to set up a voting policy determining when and how to 




70 Gaia Balp, The Corporate Governance Role of Retail Investors, 31 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 47, 59-60 (2019). 
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to the exclusive benefit of the funds and the investors in the funds.71  
Voting is thus conceived of as a duty that intermediaries owe to end-
investors wherever―based on a cost-benefit analysis―it is in the 
best interest of the beneficial owners of the shares. The end-investor 
best-interest standard overarching the entire regulation of 
investment intermediaries does not, in itself, entail a duty to vote 
every share.72  However, investment managers are clearly not 
allowed to simply remain passive and choose not to vote because, 
depending on the investment strategies adopted, voting passivity can 
be at odds with institutions’ duty to manage investments in the best 
interest of their clients.73  Regulation thus provides an incentive 
structure which, “rel[ying] on the presumption that shareholder 
voting preserves, or even increases, the long-term value of the 
 
 
71 Commission Directive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing 
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards organisational requirements, conflicts of interest, conduct of 
business, risk management and content of the agreement between a 
depositary and a management company, 2010 O.J. (L 176) 42, 53-54 
[hereinafter Commission Directive 2010/43/EU]; Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 Dec. 2012 supplementing Directive 
2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to 
exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, 
transparency and supervision, 2013 O.J. (L 83) 1, 31.  
72 See Commission Directive 2010/43/EU, supra note 71, at 44 
(explicitly considering that “[a]s the case may be, the decision not to 
exercise voting rights could be considered in certain circumstances as 
being to the exclusive benefit of the UCITS depending upon its investment 
strategy. However, the possibility for an investment company to vote itself 
or to give specific voting instructions to its management company should 
not be excluded.”).  
73 See Christian Strenger & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate 
Governance, Cross-Border Voting and the (Draft) Principles of the 
European Securities Law Legislation—Enhancing Investor Engagement 
Through Standardisation, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 503, 515-17 (2013). 
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investment,” eventually translates into some kind of “implicit duty 
to vote.”74 
In keeping with the EU provisions, Article 35-decies 1(e) of the 
Italian CLF states that asset management companies “must provide, 
in the investors' interests, for the exercise of the voting rights 
associated with the financial instruments of the collective 
investment schemes managed unless required otherwise by law.”75  
Despite the wording used within the legislation (“must provide”), 
the prevailing view is that Article 35-decies CLF does not establish 
an obligation for asset management companies to exercise their 
voting rights under all circumstances.76  In keeping with their 
general duty to “operate diligently, correctly, and with transparency 
in the best interests of the collective investment schemes managed, 
the relevant investors and the integrity of the market,” as set by 
Article 35-decies 1(a) CLF, asset management companies are 
 
 
74 Id. at 515; see also Marco Maugeri, Proxy advisors, esercizio del 
voto e doveri “fiduciari” del gestore [Proxy advisors, voting rights and 
asset managers’ fiduciary duties], PROFILI EVOLUTIVI DELLA DISCIPLINA 
SULLA GESTIONE COLLETTIVA DEL RISPARMIO 667, 680-682 (Roberta 
D’Apice ed., 2016) (It.) (further explaining that requirements to adopt 
voting strategies are organizational in nature and impose upon recipient 
investment services providers a duty concerning their internal set-ups in 
terms of the procedures to be applied. Hence, if exercising voting rights is 
conceived of as a standard of conduct, then it is in the interest of end-
investors, not in that of investee companies).  
75 Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), 
Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 Feb. 1999, 
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-and-
regulations/documenti/english/laws/fr_decree58_1998.htm?hkeywords=&
docid=0&page=0&hits=21&nav=false [hereinafter CONSOB]. 
76 See Renzo Costi, Risparmio gestito e governo societario [Asset 
management and corporate governance], in GIURISPRUDENZA 
COMMERCIALE 313, 322 (1988) (It.); see also Renzo Costi & Luca 
Enriques, Il mercato mobiliare [The Financial Market], 8 TRATTATO DI 
DIRITTO COMMERCIALE, 420 (Gastone Cottino ed., 2004) (It.). 
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expected to vote only when it is in the interest of the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the funds managed.77 
In addition, Article 124-quinquies CLF—implementing 
Articles 3g and 3f SRD II—requires institutional investors and asset 
managers, if only based on a comply-or-explain approach, to adopt 
an engagement policy that, inter alia, illustrates how they exercise 
voting rights and other shareholder rights.78  In addition, 
institutional investors and asset managers are required to publicly 
disclose each year how their engagement policy has been 
implemented and provide a general description of their voting 
behavior, an explanation of the most significant votes, and the use 
they made of proxy advisory services.79  Although it remains 
questionable whether the newly added rules for institutional 
investors and asset managers may actually contribute to increasing 
the quality of investors’ engagement with investee companies, the 
requirement that institutions disseminate information regarding 
their engagement and actual voting conduct, and the reasons thereof, 
indirectly adds to pressure on exercising voting rights.80 
 
 
77 Mario Stella Richter Jr., L’esercizio del voto con gli strumenti 
finanziari gestiti [Asset managers’ voting], in I CONTRATTI DEL MERCATO 
FINANZIARIO 791, 800 (Enrico Gabrielli & Raffaele Lener eds., 2nd ed. 
2010) (It.). 
78 CONSOB, supra note 75. 
79 Id. 
80 In particular, investors with less commitment towards shareholder 
engagement could take on a formalistic stance in complying with Article 
3f and further promote over-reliance on advisory services. In addition, 
“disclosure of engagement dialogue may undermine its essential deftness, 
fluidity, and focus on achieving a ‘win-win’ outcome for both parties. 
Public disclosure may fundamentally change the type and frequency of 
engagement and more robust and adversarial-type interactions may 
result,” thereby “undermining the success of informal private engagement 
by institutional investors.” Deirdre Ahern, The Mythical Value of Voice 
and Stewardship in the EU Directive on Long-term Shareholder 
Engagement: Rights Do Not an Engaged Shareholder Make, 20 
CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 88, 106 (2018).  
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B. PARTICIPATION IN THE SHAREHOLDER MEETING: 
INFORMATION AND DUTY TO CALL 
Reforms enacted in 2010 to transpose the SRD I into Italian 
law81 contributed to shifting the making of voting decisions prior to, 
and outside of, the shareholders meeting and to promoting better 
shareholder information and the efficiency in the mechanics of 
shareholders meetings, thereby contributing to the smoothening of 
any disincentives institutional investors may have previously 
encountered in participating in the meetings. 
One clear example of such pro-shareholder regulatory efforts 
may be drawn from Article 125-bis (4) CLF concerning the contents 
of the notice of call to shareholders meetings.  Article 125-bis (4) 
CLF requires that the notice include, among further items, “a clear, 
precise description” of the procedures to be applied in order to attend 
and vote at the shareholders meeting and to exercise further 
shareholder rights, such as the right to ask questions ahead of the 
meeting or to prompt the board of directors to take action (typically 
by requiring that additional items be put on the agenda or by 
submitting further proposals on items already on the agenda).82 
Article 125-bis (4) CLF can be viewed as the summary of a 
wider set of provisions all emphasizing the active role investors are 
expected to play in regard of the shareholders meeting.  First, 
acknowledging that being active owners requires adequate and 
timely information, Article 125-ter CLF requires that the board of 
directors make a report on each item on the agenda available by a 
specified deadline significantly ahead of an upcoming shareholder 
meeting, thereby obliging institutions’ needs to organize and 
prepare for appropriate voting determinations and by limiting the 
chilling effect associated with the delivery of relevant company 
information much too close to the date of the meeting.83  In effect, 
prior to the introduction of the record date system into national 
 
 
81 SRD I was transposed into Italian law by Legislative Decree No. 
27/2010. 
82 CONSOB, supra note 75. 
83 Id. 
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law,84 inadequate timings for information delivery had proven to 
adversely affect participation in the meeting and voting.85 
Second, a shareholder-friendly, efficiency-promoting intent 
clearly underpins Article 127-ter (1) CLF, which grants any 
shareholder the right to submit questions on the items on the agenda 
prior to the shareholders meeting and to receive the relevant answers 
“at the latest” during the meeting.86 
Finally, active ownership is further incentivized by the right 
granted to shareholders who hold a specified minimum shareholding 
threshold—usually institutional investors87—to directly activate the 
shareholders meeting.  First, shareholders holding—either 
individually or collectively—at least 5% of the share capital have 
the right to call a general meeting.88  In addition, shareholders 
holding—either individually or collectively—at least 2.5% of the 
 
 
84 See infra Part III.C.5. 
85 See Fabio Bianconi, L’attivismo delle minoranze in Italia: un 
commento [Minority Shareholder Activism: A Comment], in FTSE MIB 
Proxy Season 2010 70-71 (2011), 
http://www.proxitalia.com/dld/files/Downloads/Pubblicazioni/FTSE%20
MIB%202010%20-%20Georgeson.pdf (It.) (finding a negative correlation 
to exist between the delayed delivery of the board’s report (less than 20 
days ahead of the meeting), institutional investors’ attendance to the 
meeting, and the level of consensus to the board’s voting proposals). Still 
another relevant disincentive for foreign institutions’ participation is the 
unavailability of the board’s reports in English: see Valentina Allotti & 
Paolo Spatola, Le assemblee delle società quotate: il d.lgs. n. 27 del 27 
gennaio 2010, le prime esperienze applicative nel 2011 e il decreto 
correttivo del 2012 [Listed Companies and Shareholder Meetings in Italy] 
(Note e Studi Assonime 14/2012) 21 (2012), https://www.eticanews.it/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Assonime.pdf (It.) (according to which over 70% 
of respondent companies only deliver the notice of call to shareholder 
meetings also in English); referred to the EU context, see also Chris 
Mallin, Institutional Investors: The Vote as a Tool of Governance 16 J. 
MANAG. GOV., 177, 194 (2012). 
86 See Pederzini Elisabetta, Commento all’articoolo 127-ter 
[Comment on Article 127-ter], COMMENTARY ON THE CONSOLIDATED LAW 
ON  FINANCE, 995-998  (Vincenzo Calandra Buonaura ed., 2020) (It.). 
87 Stella Richter, supra note 77, at 800. 
88 See CODICE CIVILE [CIVIL CODE], art. 2367 (It.). 
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share capital may ask for additional matters to be put on the agenda 
of the general meeting and may table new proposed resolutions for 
a vote.89  Making voting proposals can serve not only to oppose the 
board and controlling stockholders but also to remedy the much 
criticized board-friendly practice of bundling together two or more 
issues into the same item on the agenda in such a way as to prevent 
these issues to be voted on separately.  Noticeably, bundling—most 
typically concerning the approval of the financial statements and 
dividend distributions, the approval of a set of changes to the articles 
of association, or director elections and compensation—has been 
targeted in Italy also by proxy advisors for being in contrast to best 
practice and inhibiting voting by proxy. 
C. REGULATORY INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
SHAREHOLDER MEETING 
Beyond enhancing shareholder information rights, both passive 
and active, and providing shareholders with the power to proactively 
initiate the calling of a shareholders meeting and make voting 
proposals, regulatory action taken ahead and in the wake of SRD I 
was intended to also provide a set of tools incentivizing active and 
long-term ownership.  These tools range from additional voting 
rights or dividends, conceived of as a reward for shareholder loyalty, 
to multiple voting rights, in such a way simplified proxy voting and 
proxy solicitation, say-on-pay votes, and the enhanced role to be 
played by the shareholders in the context of related party 
transactions.  While not all of these tools have proven successful in 
accomplishing the policy goal set and actually driving increased 
shareholder engagement with Italian investee companies, some 
indeed have, as is most notably the case for say-on-pay votes, 
alongside the record date regime as regards attendance at the 




89 See Article 126-bis CLF. Both the right to call a special meeting 
and to put items on the agenda cannot be exercised for items in relation to 
which, under Italian law, shareholders may be called to resolve on draft 
resolutions that have to be submitted or drafted by directors. 
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1. The Limited Relevance of Loyalty-Based Dividend 
and Vote Rewards for Supporting Institutional 
Shareholder Engagement 
With the explicit aim of encouraging longer-term investments, 
two mechanisms were introduced in 2010 and 2014 to reward 
shareholder loyalty in terms of cash flow rights or control rights.  On 
the one hand, Article 127-quarter CLF allows for a dividend-
increasing mechanism to be adopted in the articles of association by 
which “each share held by the same shareholder for a continuous 
period of time indicated in the articles, in any case of no less than 
one year or the lesser period running between two consecutive 
payment dates of the annual dividend, shall assign the right to an 
increase of no more than 10% of the dividend distributed to the other 
shares.”  Significantly, additional dividends may not be granted to, 
de jure or de facto, controlling stockholders, whether individually or 
jointly in control, nor to any shareholder wielding a significant 
influence on the company or taking part in a shareholder agreement 
accounting for more than the shareholding thresholds relevant to the 
rules on the mandatory bid laid down in Article 106 CLF.  
Therefore, quite evidently, the investor category especially targeted 
by the dividend-increasing incentive is that of mainstream 
institutional investors, which typically do not seek to gain control 
over the company, who are unwilling to take part in shareholder 
agreements due to the chilling effect associated with the rules on 
concerted action and the triggering of mandatory bids, and whose 
holdings, unlike those of some activist hedge funds, usually do not 
allow them to individually exert any significant influence over the 
company.  It is thus traditional institutions, such as pension and 
mutual funds, whether actively managed or passive, that are 
candidates to possibly be rewarded for loyalty. 
On the other hand, Article 127-quinquies CLF allows for loyal 
shareholders to enjoy additional, time-phased voting rights—up to 
two votes depending on the arrangements made in the articles of 
association—for each share uninterruptedly held by them for no less 
than two years, with additional voting rights expiring upon the sale 
of the shares.  Tenured voting may be adopted by any listed 
company as an incentivizing tool, provided, however, that no 
multiple voting structure is in place.  Hence, additional voting rights 
and multiple voting may only be alternative.  Noticeably, multiple 
voting structures—up to three votes per share—are allowed under 
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Italian law since 2014 when they were introduced with the aim of 
inducing family-owned firms (which make up the core of business 
organizations in Italy) to list more shares on the stock market 
without necessarily losing control and thus rendering Italian 
companies less reliant on bank lending.90  Shares with multiple 
voting rights can be issued by private companies only; companies 
that issued such shares prior to listing are, however, allowed to 
maintain such shares but prevented, if they so choose, from issuing 
new such shares and from adopting additional, time-phased voting 
rights.  At the same time, eliminating the ban on multiple voting 
rights, which had characterized corporate voting in Italy ever since 
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1942, was also the reaction to the 
migration of some leading Italian companies from Italy to the 
Netherlands.91 
Private ordering showed little interest in dividend-increasing 
mechanisms, whether due to the many practical problems associated 
with the implementation of the relevant provisions or simply 
because, arguably, the long-term related financial incentive 
provided by heightened dividends cannot outweigh short-term 
opportunities associated with trading stocks.92 
To the contrary, time-phased voting has proven to be more 
successful if it is considered that 51 out of 231 companies listed on 
the Italian exchange had adopted tenured voting.93  Importantly, 
however, given that time-phased voting requires the articles of 
 
 
90 See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 34-35. 
91 See, e.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple 
Voting Shares: Regulatory Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 1 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 288/2015, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2574236. 
92 See generally Mario Stella Richter Jr., I troppi problemi del 
dividendo maggiorato [The Too Many Problems of Increased Dividends], 
117 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 89 (2011) (It.).  
93 See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 35. See 
also Chiara Mosca, Should Shareholders Be Rewarded for Loyalty? 
European Experiments on the Wedge Between Tenured Voting and 
Takeover Law, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 245, 246 
(2019).  
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association to be amended, and that in order to enjoy the loyalty 
reward a shareholder is required to file a request with the company, 
the findings that adopters are almost exclusively family-owned 
controlled firms and that registrant shareholders are almost 
exclusively controllers, especially de jure controllers, are quite 
deceiving from the standpoint of the achievement of the policy goal 
to incentivize institutional shareholder long-term engagement, if not 
unsurprising.94  Altogether, the clear dominance of controlling 
shareholders in the ownership of companies adopting time-phased 
voting seems to contradict the reasoning according to which tenured 
voting encourages longer-term investments by investors other than 
controlling shareholders.  Quite to the opposite, the practice of time-
phased voting in Italy questions the effectiveness of such 
mechanism as a means for retaining shareholders over the long term 
or, at any rate, as a tool for encouraging institutional investor 
engagement with investee companies.  In a context of high levels of 
ownership concentration, tenured voting rather appears to further 
empower pre-existing long-term shareholders.  In effect, since 
controllers did not reduce their stake despite enjoying additional 
voting rights, the overall net effect of time-phased voting actually 
allowed those who were already in control to gain control over the 
extraordinary shareholders meeting as well, where a two-thirds 
majority of the share capital represented at the meeting is required 
for making any decision.95  Similarly, the fundamental lack of 
institutional investors and asset managers among the beneficiaries 
of time-phased voting supports the view that time-phased voting 




94 Emanuele Bajo et al., Bolstering Family Control: Evidence from 
Loyalty Shares (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. 25 (ECGI, Finance Working 
Paper No. 619/2019, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3428887. 
95 See Mosca, supra note 93, at 271. 
96 See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? 
Corporate Governance Consequences of Active Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 803, 843 (2018) (highlighting that tenure voting and loyalty 
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2. Proxy Voting and Remote Voting 
As mentioned above, one aim of the SRD was to remove some 
procedural hurdles which could have inhibited shareholder 
participation in the shareholders meeting.  Along the same lines, 
Italian rules on proxy voting and proxy solicitation were simplified 
in 2010 so as to render them less restrictive than they previously 
were.  Changes were also made to the rules on voting by 
correspondence and electronic means.  
Removing unnecessary restrictions to proxy voting is a tool for 
facilitating shareholder participation.  Additionally, other tools that 
allow cost-effective participation at a distance and in absentia or 
voting in advance of the meeting, such as electronic real-time 
transmission of the meeting, real-time two-way communication 
enabling shareholders to address the meeting from a remote 
location, electronic voting, and voting by correspondence.  
However, in regards to voting at a distance or in absentia, practical 
experience in Italy casts doubts on the efficacy of the measures 
adopted to achieve the policy goal set. 
Under Article 2370 (4) Civil Code and Article 127 CLF, voting 
at a distance is allowed both by correspondence and by remote.  
Unlike voting by correspondence, voting by remote theoretically 
allows for direct and potentially interactive participation in the 
meeting.  However, electronic and online voting are not mandatory 
under Italian law, but neither is voting by correspondence.  It rests 
with the issuers to determine whether or not to adopt any of these 
 
 
dividends, cannot alter the conduct of institutional investors and, 
especially of the so-called passive index fund managers “[b]ecause passive 
investors as permanent shareholders cannot sell shares included in the 
reference index, they commit to the long term—irrespective of the level of 
their voting rights—and may forego loyalty benefits simply because of 
portfolio rebalancing”). 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 




enabling tools.97  Thus, despite the alternative-design approach 
adopted at the regulatory level, enhanced shareholder empowerment 
relies primarily on the arrangements that individual companies may 
take in this respect, and a shareholder willing to vote her shares 
without appointing a proxy agent will, or will not, be enabled to do 
so remotely or in advance of the meeting depending on whether her 
investee company actually offers her (one or more of) those tools.  
As a matter of fact, in Italy voting by correspondence has remained 
virtually ignored.98  Similarly, Italian-listed companies do not 
necessarily offer investors the opportunity to participate in the 
meeting and vote the shares at a distance via electronic means, 
possibly to account for cost considerations concerning the relevant 
technology.  At any rate, it is unclear whether large institutional 
investors, who routinely employ proxy advisors to help them make 
voting determinations, would really refrain from voting the shares 
only because of the need, absent electronic voting, to appoint a local 
proxy agent.99  This state of affairs helps explain why appointing a 
 
 
97 Interestingly, out of the 28 countries in the European Economic 
Area that responded to a query by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority, only Hungary and Iceland reported that they had mandated 
provision of electronic means to enable shareholders attend the meeting, 
including for voting. See EUR. SEC'S MKT. AUTH., REPORT ON 
SHAREHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, 28-29 
(ESMA 31-54-435) (Apr. 5, 2017). Detail implementing provisions for 
voting by correspondence and voting via electronic means are set by 
Articles 140 to 143-ter Consob Regulation no. 11971. 
98 See Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, Corporate Governance e assemblea 
delle società quotate in Italia: un’indagine empirica [An empirical inquiry 
into corporate governance and the shareholders meeting at corporations 
publicly listed in Italy], 51 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 416 (2006) (It.). The 
changes made to Article 127 CLF in the SRD I transposition process were 
minor in nature and did not change the substance of voting by 
correspondence in any meaningful way. 
99 See Marco Cian, Intervento e voto in assemblea: le nuove 
tecnologie come mezzo per promuovere l’attivismo degli investitori 
istituzionali? [Participating and voting in the shareholders meeting: new 
technologies as a tool to promote institutional investor activism?], in 
GOVERNO DELLE SOCIETÀ QUOTATE E ATTIVISMO DEGLI INVESTITORI 
ISTITUZIONALI (Corporate governance and institutional investor activism) 
104 (Marco Maugeri ed., 2015). 
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proxy agent remains the voting tool most used by institutional 
shareholders.100  Voting by proxy is possible under Italian law in 
different ways, either according to the regime set by Article 2372 
Civil Code, or that provided for by Articles 135-novies to 135-
undecies CLF for publicly listed corporations, which underwent 
major simplification over time. 
On the other hand, proxy fights based on the proxy solicitation 
regime set by Articles 136 to 138 CLF remain episodic in the Italian 
context despite the changes made in 2010 to the relevant rules.  The 
changes aimed to remove the many substantive limitations which, 
alongside high costs, had previously prevented proxy solicitations 
from ever growing into a workable pathway for active share 
ownership.  A shareholder willing to solicit proxies is no longer 
under the obligation to enlist an intermediary to carry out the 
process, as she was before the 2010 changes.  In addition, a soliciting 
shareholder is no longer required to meet certain requirements in 
terms of minimum shareholding thresholds, nor to solicit proxies 
from all of its fellow shareholders.  In its current version, Article 
136 (1)(b) CLF allows for a soliciting party to address a minimum 
of 200 shareholders, hence allowing the soliciting party to 
selectively address its fellow shareholders.101  Alongside the 
possibility to disseminate proxy materials (a proxy statement and a 
proxy form) via a website chosen by the soliciting person, which 
may also be the issuer's site if the issuer so agrees,102 such measures 
 
 
100 It remains to be seen whether implementation of Articles 3a and 
3b of SRD II concerning shareholder identification and the transmission of 
information along the investment chain, by allowing companies to 
improve communication with their shareholder base and facilitating the 
exercise of shareholder rights, will also encourage issuers’ voluntary 
adoption of electronic means for participating in the voting process as a 
tool by which to support shareholder engagement. 
101 Under Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 136 (1)(b) 
CLF, proxy solicitation is defined as “a request to more than two hundred 
shareholders for proxy to be conferred in relation to specific voting 
proposals, or accompanied by recommendations, statements or other 
indications capable of influencing the vote”.  
102 See Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 136 (3) of 
Consob Regulation No. 11971. 
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contributed to reducing the costs associated with the process, to be 
borne by the soliciting party, thus theoretically enabling a 
shareholder to more cost-effectively strengthen its voting power in 
regard to specific voting proposals by soliciting proxies from like-
minded fellow shareholders.  Moreover, one-way proxies are no 
longer mandatory for any soliciting shareholder as they previously 
were.  Enabling two-way proxies, which, importantly, are 
mandatory where the soliciting person is the issuer itself,103 reduces 
the chilling effect associated with one-way proxies for solicited 
shareholders actually wishing to vote by proxy, but to do so in a way 
other than that proposed by the soliciting party.  Lower costs and 
greater flexibility seem to have revitalized proxy solicitation as a 
lever for active share ownership, at least to some extent.  Although 
soliciting proxies is still not commonplace in Italy, probably as a 
consequence of concentrated ownership with major stakeholders 
able to control the voting outcomes at shareholders meetings, it has 
become increasingly frequent, at least under specific circumstances 
concerning the issuer.104 
3. Say-on-Pay Votes on the Remuneration Policy and 
Director Compensation Transparency 
In order to empower shareholders, the Italian legislature 
broadened the list of the issues falling within the remit of the general 
meeting over time.105  For example, defensive measures against 
 
 
103 See Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 138 (2) of 
Consob Regulation No. 11971. 
104 One proxy fight that became famous for being “Italy’s fiercest 
proxy contest in decades” occurred in 2012 when a shareholders meeting 
was called by Salini at Impregilo to remove the Gavio group-dominated 
board; the context in which the case occurred was a peculiar one, since it 
was characterized by both hedge fund activism targeting Salini and an 
unstable ownership structure as a consequence of shareholder coalitions 
dominating the company with stakes less than 30% of  the share capital. 
See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 26-27. See also Proxitalia, 
http://www.proxitalia.com/Page.asp/id=404/operazioni-concluse, 
accessed February 12, 2020 (providing an illustrative list of proxy 
fights managed at Italian listed companies). 
105 Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 7-8. 
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hostile takeovers, unless the company has opted out of the so-called 
board neutrality rule, need to be authorized by the shareholders 
meeting.  Similarly, the requirement that any amendments to the 
articles of association be approved by a supermajority of two-thirds 
of the share capital represented at the meeting is clearly aimed at 
incentivizing attendance by minority shareholders. 
Further still, after introducing a precatory say-on-pay vote in 
regard of the company’s remuneration policy in 2012, the current 
version of Article 123-ter CLF—as amended by Legislative Decree 
no. 49 of 10 May 2019 implementing Article 9a SRD II—has made 
say-on-pay votes binding.  The company must hold Say-on-pay at 
least every three years, or whenever the board proposes any changes 
to the remuneration policy last approved by the shareholders.  
Hence, companies “shall only allocate fees in compliance with the 
remuneration policy most recently approved by the shareholders.”106  
As an explanation for rendering say-on-pay binding in nature, the 
draft explanatory report to Legislative Decree no. 49/2019 
emphasizes the need to align the provisions on the remuneration 
policy of all listed companies to those that were already in force for 
banks and insurance companies, which provide for a binding say-
on-pay votes.107  In addition, the scope of application of binding say-
on-pay votes on the remuneration policy was broadened to also 
include compensation to the members of the board of statutory 
auditors, alongside that regarding the members of the board of 
directors, general managers and executives with strategic 
responsibilities (see Article 123-ter (3)(a) CLF). 
 
 
106 See CONSOB, Article 123-ter (3-bis) CLF. 
107 See Draft Explanatory Report to Legislative Decree, no. 49/2019 
(February 8, 2019), 7 (in Italian only), 
http://documenti.camera.it/apps/nuovosito/attigoverno/Schedalavori/getTe
sto.ashx?file=0071_F001.pdf&leg=XVIII#pagemode=none. See also 
BANK OF ITALY, Circular no. 285/2013, Part I, Title IV, Chapter 2, Sec II, 
para 1 (Dec. 2013), 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/normativa/archivio-
norme/circolari/c285/aggiornamenti/Testo-int-30-agg.pdf (It.) (providing 
that remuneration policies for corporate boards be approved by the 
shareholders meeting by a binding vote). 
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As a tool for enhanced director accountability, say-on-pay votes 
are meant to strengthen institutional investor monitoring.108  First, 
from the standpoint of shareholder oversight, significant levels of 
against and withhold say-on-pay votes quite clearly shows that a 
portion of the shareholders withdrew support from the board, and 
their dissent is made public.109  Second, say-on-pay votes can be 
regarded as being functionally complimentary to the rights granted 
to shareholders under the slate voting system for director 
elections,110 to obtain that at least one director be elected by 
minorities.  If it is considered that minority-elected directors are 
very often elected to the remuneration committee within the board, 
the combined potential effect of say-on-pay votes and slate voting 
can provide minorities with a form of intra-board monitoring over 
the determinations concerning board compensation that may favor 
alignment with international best practices (first and foremost in 
regard to enhanced transparency), thus further encouraging 
shareholder engagement.111  Interestingly, following the first 
implementation of precatory say-on-pay, a positive correlation has 
been found to exist between the presence of minority-elected 
directors within the remuneration committee and increased 
institutional investor participation in the shareholder meetings.112  
Moreover, low-quality information in the remuneration report has 
been found to be positively correlated with higher levels of against 
and withhold say-on-pay votes, suggesting that shareholders do 
lever say-on-pay votes as a tool for corporate stewardship.113  The 
 
 
108 See, e.g., Commission Recommendation (EC) No. 385/2009, 
recital 10, according to which “to increase accountability, shareholders 
should be encouraged to attend general meetings and make considered use 
of their voting rights. In particular, institutional shareholders should take a 
leading role in the context of ensuring increased accountability of boards 
with regard to remuneration issues”, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0028:0031:
EN:PDF. 
109 See infra Parts III.D.1 and IV. 
110 See infra Parts III.D.1 and IV. 
111 See infra Part IV. 
112 See infra Part IV. 
113 See Belcredi et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
20, 25-26. 
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significance of say-on-pay votes on the remuneration policy is, in 
fact, further heightened by the fact that the fees actually paid to 
directors, general managers, executives with strategic 
responsibilities, and members of the board of statutory auditors 
during the financial year need to be submitted to a shareholders’ 
vote, if still non-binding.114  Moreover, the board of directors is 
required to illustrate yearly how the company has taken account of 
the vote cast the previous year on the fees paid.115  
4. Related Party Transactions and Shareholder 
Oversight 
The rulings on related party transactions are among the most 
significant rulings intended to reduce principal-principal agency 
costs associated with controllers’ potential for self-dealing,116 which 
was first introduced in Italy as early as 2010 to be only slightly 
amended in 2019 in the process of transposing Article 9 (c) SRD II 
into national law.  The general provisions on related party 
transactions are drawn in Articles 2391-bis of the Civil Code, which 
vests Consob with the authority to lay down rules aimed at ensuring 
that related party transactions are transparent, are illustrated in the 
board’s annual report to the financial statements and comply with 
procedural and substantive fairness requirements, and Article 154-
ter (4) CLF, which requires the board’s interim report to half-yearly 
financial statements to also include information on significant, 
related party transactions.117  The contents of such information, as 
 
 
114 See ArticleCLF [C.c.] art. 123-ter (6) (It.) (providing that the 
shareholders meeting resolves in favor or against the section of the 
remuneration report to be drawn by the board of directors illustrating, in a 
clear and understandable manner, each of the items comprising 
remuneration, as well as the fees paid during the financial year, and that 
such resolution is not binding). 
115 See CLF [C.c] art. 123-ter (4) (b-bis) (It.). 
116 See generally Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy 
Options and Real-World Challenges (With a Critique of the European 
Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
117 See CIVIL CODE [C.c] art. 2391-bis (It.); CLF [C.c] art. 154-ter (4) 
(It.). 
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well as substantive regulation of related party transactions, are laid 
down by Consob in Regulation no. 17221 of March 12, 2010, which 
envisages safeguards aimed at protecting the company and its non-
controlling shareholders against potential value diversion or 
misappropriation by controllers and further related parties, including 
detailed provisions involving independent directors in the decision-
making process and, in some cases, empowering dissenting 
minorities to prevent the transaction.  Regulation 17221 is currently 
in the process of being updated following the SRD II.118  However, 
if it is considered that such regulation will not undergo major 
changes, its current version is still fully meaningful to provide an 
overview of the general regime related party transactions are 
subjected to in Italy.  
First, Article 4 of Regulation no. 17221 requires that the board 
of directors adopt a specified internal procedure to ensure 
transparency as well as substantial and procedural fairness of related 
party transactions.119  Second, Article 5 of the same regulation 
requires that the company publicly disclose material transactions in 
accordance with Article 114 (5) CLF120 and Article 17 of Regulation 
(EU) no. 596/2014. 
Further, according to Article 8 of Regulation no. 17221, the 
board of directors may approve material, related party transactions 
(transactions “of greater importance,” as identified through a set of 
 
 
118 See Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa (Consob), 




(regulations containing provisions relating to transactions with 
related parties). Public consultation concerning the proposed amendments 
to Regulation 17221/2010 was launched on October 31, 2010. 
119 See Consob Regulation No. 17221, art. 4 (2010). 
120 See CLF [C.c] art. 114 (5) (It.) (Providing that Consob may 
require the issuers, the subjects which control them, board members, 
managers and persons who hold major holdings or who are parties to a 
shareholders’ agreement to publish the information and documents needed 
to inform the public); Commission Regulation 596/2014, art. 17, 2014 J.O. 
(L 173) 1 (EU).  
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quantitative parameters) only if favorable advice has been 
previously given by a committee of independent directors involved 
in the negotiations; however, company-specific related party 
procedures may stipulate that the board may approve the transaction 
despite the negative opinion from the committee if and only if a 
shareholders meeting is convened and a majority of unrelated 
shareholders approve the transaction (the so-called ‘whitewash’).121  
Instead, the board may approve transactions “of lesser importance” 
notwithstanding the negative opinion of the committee, which, in 
addition, is not required to lead the negotiations and is without 
recourse to the shareholders meeting whitewash.122  According to 
Annex 1 of Regulation no. 17221 (concerning definitions functional 
to the definitions of related parties and related party transactions), 
an entity is a related party to a company if, among others, the party 
“controls the company, is controlled by, or is under common 
control.”123  
Once again, the interaction between the Italian regimes for 
related party transactions and for director elections through the 
mandatory slate voting system needs to be considered in order to 
fully understand how such interaction can support active 
shareholder monitoring and stewardship.  In effect, since ex ante 
independent scrutiny of related party transactions is required to 
ensure that the transaction is fair for the company and all of its 
shareholders, minority board representation ensured by slate voting 
can also improve self-dealing oversight.  At Italian-listed 
companies, the presence of minority-elected directors appointed by 
institutional investors has had a positive impact on the adequacy of 
internal procedures for addressing related party transactions.124  In 
 
 
121See Consob Regulation No. 17221, art. 8, 2010,  
122 See Consob Regulation No. 17221, art. 7, 2010. 
123 See Consob Regulation No. 17221, annex 1, 2010 (emphasis 
added). 
124 See Marcello Bianchi et al., Regulation and Self-Regulation of 
Related Party Transactions in Italy: An Empirical Analysis (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst. 25 (ECGI, Finance Working Paper No. 415/2014, 2014), 
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particular, “the presence of at least one minority director is indeed 
associated with adoption of stricter internal codes, not only when 
minority directors are members of the committee of independent 
directors vetting internal codes, but also when they merely sit on the 
board.”125  Indeed, the very reason why mandatory slate voting was 
originally adopted in Italy for board elections at listed companies 
was to secure minority board representation as a monitoring tool 
deployed by active shareholders, in keeping with the view that 
institutional investors should be encouraged to act as corporate 
stewards.126  Further findings from the Italian context seem to 
support the hypothesis that non-executive minority directors reduce 
principal-principal agency costs associated with controllers’ 
potential self-dealing, and positively affect firm value, “even in 
presence of factors (uncertainty about future financial results and 
high information asymmetry) that might exacerbate the risk of hold-
up by minority shareholders.”127  Thus, “the benefits associated to 
the active monitoring role by the independent minority directors 
outweigh the costs of potential frictions within the board.”128  
 
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383237. It should be 
noticed that Regulation no. 17221 introduced both stricter procedural 
requirements and heightened disclosure obligations, however leaving 
some freedom to the board of directors in drawing the individual 
company’s internal procedure for RPTs: the board is thus allowed to opt-
up or opt-down from some of the provisions set forth in the regulation as 
defaults. 
125 Id. at 25 (also finding that, to the contrary, the degree of board 
independence, as measured by the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board, does not have an impact on the strictness of such 
internal procedures).  
126 See Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors' 
Independence at Controlled Companies, 44 J. CORP. L. 103, 135-36 
(2018). See also Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in 
Directors’ Elections: A Revolution in the Making, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. 
REV. 105, 141 (2011). 
127 Nicola Moscariello et al., Independent Minority Directors and 
Firm Value in a Principal–Principal Agency Setting: Evidence from Italy, 
23 J. MGMT. AND GOV. 18–19 (2019). 
128 Id. 
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5. The Pivotal Impact of the Record Date System on 
Boosting Institutional Investors’ Voting 
Although they do significantly empower minority shareholders, 
most of the regulatory measures illustrated above would still not 
have provided institutional investors with an incentive strong 
enough to subsidize increased participation in the shareholders 
meeting had it not been for the mandatory adoption of the record 
date regime to regulate attendance and voting in the meeting.  In 
fact, the blocking requirement imposed on the shares for up to two 
days prior to the meeting, which was previously enshrined in Article 
2370 Civil Code, amounted to a significant economic impediment 
on institutional investor attendance, since it seriously restricted the 
ability of investors to freely trade their shares for a not insignificant 
number of days ahead of the meeting.129  Thus, the shift toward the 
mandatory record date system (See Article 83-sexies CLF) has 
greatly reduced the main economic disincentive associated with 
participating in the meeting and has indeed proven to be crucial in 
boosting institutional investor voting, especially with regards to 
foreign institutions.130  As the evidence available quite clearly 
shows, after introducing the record date regime in 2010, institutional 
investors’ participation in the shareholders meetings has virtually 
doubled at non-controlled Italian listed companies, and has 
remarkably increased even at de jure controlled companies, in spite 




129 See B. Espen Eckbo & Giulia Paone, Reforming Share-Voting 
Systems: The Case of Italy 7-8 (Tuck School of Bus. Working Paper No. 
2011-93), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1822287.  
130 Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 21. 
131 See Mario Notari, Diritti di voice degli azionisti e tutela delle 
minoranze [Shareholders’ voice and protections of minority shareholders], 
in IL TESTO UNICO DELLA FINANZA. UN BILANCIO DOPO 15 ANNI  
[CONSOLIDATED LAW ON FINANCE AT 15] 247, 256-257. (Filippo 
Annunziata ed., Egea 2015) (It.).  
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D. SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
As illustrated above,132 various actions have been taken in order 
to support, facilitate and incentivize institutional investor 
participation and voting at shareholders meetings.  However, other 
forms of engagement that usually take place outside the general 
meeting exist which remain substantially unregulated, despite their 
increasing relevance within the practice of engagement.133  
Article 124-quinquies CLF (almost literally transposing Article 
3g(1)(a) SRD II) now requires―if only on a comply or explain 
basis―that institutional investors publish their engagement policy 
yearly to illustrate, among other things, the ways in which “investors 
monitor investee companies on important issues, including strategy, 
financial and non-financial results as well as risks, capital structure, 
social and environmental impact and corporate governance, interact 
with investee companies,  
. . . cooperate with other shareholders, and communicate with the 
relevant stakeholders of the investee companies.”134  In line with the 
principles set by virtually any stewardship code, whether national or 
international, Article 124-quinquies CLF makes it clear that 
engagement is more than just voting and includes “investment 
decision-making, monitoring assets and service providers, engaging 
with issuers and holding them to account on material issues, 
collaborating with others, and exercising rights and 
responsibilities.”135 
The importance of shareholders’ engagement is clearly 
recognized also by the Italian Corporate Governance Code 2020 
 
 
132 See supra Part III.A-C. 
133 See generally Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The 
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. Fin. 
2905, 2911–16 (2016); Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom 
Door: A Transatlantic Overview of Director-Institutional Investor 
Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 187 (2018). 
134 CONSOB, Article 124-quinquies CLF. 
135 FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020 (Oct. 
2019), 7, https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-
4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Dec-19-Final.pdf. 
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according to which “[t]he board of directors promotes dialogue with 
shareholders and other stakeholders which are relevant for the 
company, in the most appropriate way.”136  To that end, the Code 
recommends “the board of directors adopts and describes in the 
corporate governance report a policy for managing dialogue with the 
generality of shareholders, taking into account the engagement 
policies adopted by institutional investors and asset managers.”137 
Some engagements may best be conducted privately by a single 
investor, and many take place behind closed doors.138  However, 
there are forms of public engagement which have proven quite 
effective in the Italian context.  In particular, Italian experience with 
director elections through the slate voting system suggests 
coordinated engagements by institutional investors can have a 
positive impact on investee companies, especially with regard to 
corporate governance issues.  Closely following EFAMA,139 the 
Italian Stewardship Principles acknowledge that the collective one 
“may be the most effective method of engagement.”140  Over the 
years, Assogestioni has been increasingly taking on an active role in 
providing operational support to its affiliates,141 thus developing a 
peculiar pathway for collective engagement and showing that 
investor associations can play a proactive role within the framework 
for stewardship, as they can catalyze investors’ stewardship efforts 
by favoring the redistribution of the engagement costs among the 
 
 
136 CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., supra note 47, at 5. 
137 Id., at 6. 
138 See supra note 133. See also Elroy Dimson et al., Coordinated 
Engagements 9 (July 1, 2020) (Working Paper) (on file with SSRN), 
https://ssrn.com/id=3209072. 
139 See EUR. FUND AND ASSET MANAG’NT. ASS’N, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 4 (recommending that asset managers “should 
consider acting with other investors, where appropriate.” Guidance to 
Principle 4 further emphasizes that shareholder collaboration may 
sometimes be “the most effective manner in which to engage.”). 
140 Assogestioni, supra note 63, at 17-18. 
141 See generally Strampelli, supra note 126, at 134-35. 
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institutional investors that carry out engagement activities 
collectively.142 
Individual and collective engagements might further be 
facilitated by the new rules on shareholder identification set by 
Article 83-duodecies CLF, as amended following the SRD II. 
1. Director (and Statutory Auditor) Elections 
Through Slate Voting 
The most distinctive feature of the Italian corporate governance 
framework is the right to board representation that is granted to 
minority shareholders through the slate voting system (voto di lista), 
which is mandatory for corporate elections at all listed companies.  
It proved to be crucial to empower institutional investors insofar as 
minorities enjoy the right to elect at least one member of the board 
of directors and one member of the board of statutory auditors.  
Under slate voting, corporate boards are elected from competing 
slates of nominees, which are usually submitted by sponsoring 
shareholders.  The majority of directors are elected from the slate 
receiving the largest number of votes at the shareholders meeting 
(so-called “majority slate”), but at least one director must be picked 
from the slate that obtains the largest number of votes after the 
majority slate (so-called “minority slate”)143 and that is not linked in 
 
 
142 With the aim of favoring the sharing of engagement-related 
benefits and costs among investors, costs are allocated in proportion of the 
"size" of associated asset managers: see ASSOGESTIONI, Bylaws 34 (2016), 
http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,813,11301/statuto-marzo-2016.pdf 
(stating that each member must pay a fee comprised of a fixed amount and 
a variable amount, which is established by dividing the remaining portion 
of the budget amongst all members in proportion with the assets collected 
and/or managed at the end of the previous year). See also Balp & 
Strampelli, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 45-48. 
143 See Art. 147-ter (3) (1998) (under which “the member elected 
from the minority slate must satisfy the integrity, experience and 
independence requirements established pursuant to Articles 148(3) and 
148(4). Failure to satisfy the requirements shall result in disqualification 
from the position.”). See generally Guido Ferrarini et al., Corporate 
Boards in Italy, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE 367, 392–
393 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013). 
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any way, either directly or indirectly, to the majority slate that won 
the most votes.
144
  In particular, under Article 147-ter CLF, 
shareholders holding a minimum threshold of shares—set by 
Consob and currently varying between 0.5% and 4.5%145—are 
entitled to present lists of candidates for election to the board of 
directors.  The same applies to elections to the board of statutory 
auditors according to Article 148 CLF, under which the chair of the 
board must be picked from the statutory auditors elected from the 
minority slate.  Mandatory slate voting was first introduced in 1998, 
limited however to elections to the board of statutory auditors.146  In 
2005, ensuing the financial scandal around Parmalat, slate voting 
was extended to elections to the board of directors as well.147 
Minority shareholders willing to submit a slate of director 
nominees and ready to bear the (non-negligible) costs associated are 
thus offered a way of gaining access to the boardroom and having a 
direct insight into the company’s affairs.  Arguably, cost 
considerations are part of an explanation for the crucial role that 
Assogestioni has been playing in the process of selecting director 
 
 
144 Article 144 (6) of Consob Regulation no. 11971 clearly 
states “[a] shareholder may not submit or vote for more than one 
list, including through nominees or trust companies. Shareholders 
belonging to the same group and shareholders participating in a 
shareholder agreement involving the shares of the issuer may not 
submit or vote for more than one list, including through nominees 
or trust companies. A candidate may only be present in one list, 
under penalty of ineligibility.” Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini et 
al., Board Elections and Shareholder Activism: The Italian Experiment, in 
BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES: FACTS, 
CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS REFORMS 378–83 (Massimo Belcredi & Guido 
Ferrarini eds., 2013). See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 8–9. 
145 See 11971 Consob Regulation Art. 144-quater (1999). The 
minimum threshold set by Consob varies depending on the company’s 
capitalization. Shareholders are not, however, prevented from setting a 
lower shareholding threshold in the articles of association. 
146  See Belcredi & Ferrarini, et al., supra note 144, at 367. 
147 Id. 
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nominees and submitting minority slates ever since the introduction 
of slate voting.  If it is considered that, under the Italian Stewardship 
Principles, “[t]he presentation of candidates for election as 
independent minority members of boards of investee companies, 
also through the [Assogestioni] Investment Managers’ Committee, 
represents a continuous and constructive method of engaging with 
investee companies,”148 submitting slates of director nominees has 
indeed grown into an increasingly significant tool for exerting 
investor active ownership.149  More so, slate voting, combined with 
the proactive role played by Assogestioni as an enabling entity, has 
proven to be a fundamental lever by which to support (non-activist) 
institutional investors’ collective action as a viable and cost-
effective pathway for engaging investee companies. 
Assogestioni does not promote shareholder collaboration 
loosely, but indeed provides institutionalized support for collective 
engagement by leveraging the national regulatory framework for 
corporate elections at listed companies.  Based on a formalized 
procedure, candidates for election as minority representatives to 
corporate boards are selected in accordance with the “principles for 
the selection of candidates for corporate bodies of listed companies” 
drawn up by the Assogestioni Corporate Governance Committee.
150
  
The Investment Managers’ Committee is in charge of selecting 
candidates with the assistance of an independent advisor.  The 
independent advisor is charged with maintaining a database of 
possible candidates and submitting to the Investment Managers’ 
Committee a short list of those that appear to best meet the 
 
 
148 Assogestioni, supra note 63, at 17. 
149 See infra Part IV.2. 
150  Such committee is composed of members of Assogestioni’s 
board and representatives of member companies.  See Assogestioni, 
PROTOCOL OF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE AND THE INVESTMENT MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE  
20–21 (2017) (such committee is composed of members of Assogestioni’s 
board and representatives of member companies). 
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requirements for each corporate office.
151
  Further still, candidates 
must have adequate professionalism, integrity, and independence;152 
to avoid possible conflicts of interest, legal representatives of 
investment management companies and, unless at least one year has 
elapsed since the relevant appointments were relinquished, anyone 
who has served in a senior management or an executive role at an 
investment management company may not be selected as a 
candidate.
153
  In addition, to ensure that candidates be independent 
vis-à-vis the company for which they are nominated, “[m]embers of 
governing or supervisory bodies and senior managers of institutions 
and companies that have significant business ties with the company 
for which they are nominated may be selected as candidates 
provided that at least one year has elapsed since the end of these 
appointments.”154  If elected, candidates are required not to accept 
any senior management position or corporate appointment at the 
same company or at any other company belonging to the same 
corporate group for at least one year after the end of their term, 
unless they are nominated once again as candidates by the 
Investment Managers’ Committee.155 
Ever since its adoption, slate voting has been conceived of as a 
lever to secure minority board representation and subsidize active 
 
 
151 Id., at 24-26 (specifying that “[e]ven when minority slates are 
presented for elections to boards, the Committee members undertake no 
obligation in regard to the exercise of voting rights during general 
meetings.”) The Investment Managers’ Committee is composed solely of 
representatives of member investment management companies or other 
Italian or foreign institutional investors, who communicate each time to 
the Committee’s secretariat their interest in participating in the submission 
of the individual slates for minority candidates’ election to the boards of 
Italian investee listed issuers). 
152 Id., at 26. 
153  Id., at 28–29 (also stating that persons who hold a senior 
management or executive role in investment management companies may 
not be selected as candidates for company boards). 
154 Id., at 29. 
155 Id., at 30. 
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shareholder monitoring.156  Noticeably however, chiefly on account 
of the ownership structures of Italian listed companies, such systems 
for board elections can sometimes lead to unexpected and, to some 
extent, counterintuitive situations.  Specifically, at so-called de facto 
controlled companies, where controllers hold less than 50% of the 
voting rights, institutional investors collectively may actually own 
the majority of the votes or, at any rate, a proportion of the votes 
larger than that of the controlling stockholders.157  Hence, it is 
increasingly the case—especially at larger corporations where de 
facto controllers hold a relatively small stake—that the list 
submitted by institutional investors under the coordination of 
Assogestioni actually receives more votes than that submitted by (de 
facto) controlling shareholders, and sometimes even an absolute 
majority of the votes.158  If it is considered that, based on the 
engagement strategy adopted by Assogestioni, affiliated institutions 
only present so-called short lists of director nominees in order to 
avoid taking control of the company by electing a majority of the 
board,159 where minority-submitted lists receive the majority of the 
votes cast, a majority of the shareholders ends up appointing a 
minority of the directors, whilst a minority (as the de facto 
controlling shareholder) appoints a majority.  Paradoxical as it may 
appear, such outcome is in line with the approach to investor 
 
 
156 See Strampelli, supra note 126, at 135–36. 
157 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CAPITAL MARKET 
REVIEW OF ITALY 2018: MAPPING REPORT 53-54 (2018)), 
www.oecd.org/corporate/OECD-Capital-Market-Review-Italy-Mapping-
Report-2018.pdf. 
158 Mario Stella Jr. Richter & Federico Ferdinandi, The Evolving Role 
of the Board: Board Nomination and the Management of Dissenting 
Opinions, 4 ITALIAN L.J. 611, 613 (2018).  
159 See Assogestioni, supra note 150, at 23. Interestingly, also hedge 
funds most often take advantage of short-slate rules, since the submission 
of a short slate can encourage them “to seek board representation with the 
possible objective of putting the company up for sale, but without 
themselves acquiring control. Because hedge funds are not typically 
strategic bidders and traditionally did not want control (which carried 
some risk of liability), this rule well served their needs”. See John C. 
Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge 
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 560 (2016). 
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stewardship adopted by the Italian Stewardship Principles, 
according to which the appointment of some independent directors 
only “serve[s] as a method of monitoring.”160 Consistent with such 
approach, engagement promoted by Assogestioni is primarily aimed 
at minimizing “the agency costs arising from the presence of a 
controlling shareholder by sharing management decisions, and thus 
by exercising closer monitoring,”161 and not—in contrast to the 
usual approach of hedge funds—at influencing firms’ strategic and 
financial decision-making, also by replacing management.162 
 
 
160 Assogestioni, supra note 63, at 16; in fact, the regulatory 
framework for acquisition of major holdings or control in European listed 
companies applicable to traditional UCITS funds —but not to alternative 
funds reserved to professional investors (AIFs, such as hedge funds)— 
prevents mutual UCITS funds from acquiring or exercising control (or 
significant influence) over investee companies in order to limit risk 
concentration. See Simone Alvaro & Filippo Annunziata, Shareholdings of 
Alternative Investment Funds in Listed Companies and in Banks: A Legal 
Perspective, 14 (Consob Legal Research Paper No. 17, 2018), 
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/lp17.pdf/2ca235bc-17a1-
4bda-9efb-569d9ff361b8. This, in turn, helps explain why hedge funds 
may submit long, or even full, slates of director nominees to a shareholder 
vote. See also Coffee & Palia, supra note 159, at 560 (noting that “[t]he 
goal of the short slate rule also was to encourage ‘constructive 
engagement’ through minority board representation-without a 
confrontational battle between activists and the issuer.”).  
161 Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated 
Ownership Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in 
Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 328, 
371 (2013). See also Belcredi & Ferrarini et al., supra note 144, at 414; 
Luigi Zingales, Italy Leads in Protecting Minority Investors, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/357c40c4-094d-11dd-81bf-
0000779fd2ac (considering that a vote for a minority list sponsored by 
Assogestioni is not “a vote against the management but a vote to ensure 
truly independent board members and avoid the representation of other 
opportunistic minority shareholders, who might have other goals in 
mind”). 
162 Erede, supra note 161, at 370. 
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2. Shareholder Identification as a Tool for favoring 
Collective Shareholder Initiatives 
With a view to promoting institutional investors’ active 
ownership, Article 83-duodecies CLF, last amended in 2019 to 
transpose SRD II, explicitly conceives of shareholder identification 
as a means by which to “facilitate issuers’ communication with 
shareholders as well as the exercise of shareholder rights, including 
in a coordinated manner.”163 
Issuers are entitled to require intermediaries along the 
investment chain to identify the shareholders, however limited to 
those holding more than 0.5% of the voting rights;164 the costs 
associated with the process of identifying the shareholders are borne 
by the issuer (see Article 83-duodecies (1)).  Importantly, Article 
83-duodecies (3) CLF imposes an obligation on the company to start 
the identification process upon request of minority shareholders, 
whereas the minimum threshold required for the shareholders to 
make such request is the same set for submitting a slate of director 
nominees under Article 147-ter CLF.  Hence, the threshold 
shareholders are required to meet to initiate the process varies 
between 0.5% and 4.5% of the share capital depending on the size 
 
 
163 See Article 83-duodecies (1) CLF (emphasis added). 
164 Noticeably, under the previous version of Article 83-duodecies 
CLF companies (or shareholders holding a certain stake) were allowed to 
request shareholder identification only where such right was actually set 
out in the articles of association; in turn, no restriction applied as regards 
the shareholders to be identified, since the request was not restricted to 
shareholders holding more than a certain percentage of shares or voting 
rights. According to the draft explanatory report, setting the minimum 
threshold to exercise the right to request the identification above 0.5% of 
the share capital was needed in order to avoid that shareholder 
identification be used as a defensive measure by directors or controlling 
shareholders against smaller shareholders aiming at building up more 
relevant stakes. It should be noticed, however, that setting such threshold 
entails that companies will not be able, as a matter of fact, to (also) 
identify their retail shareholder base, if they wished so. As a result, an 
issuer’s interest in reaching out to its retail shareholders may diminish at 
companies where the shareholder base includes a significant proportion of 
retail investors. 
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of the company and its ownership structure.  Where the process is 
started upon shareholder request, the costs are shared between the 
issuer and the requesting shareholders based on criteria set by 
Consob in such way as to oblige the need that shareholder requests 
be in line with the aim of facilitating shareholder coordination.165  In 
any case, data concerning shareholder identification are made 
available to shareholders “on a commonly-used electronic storage 
device free of charge,”166 irrespective of whether the process was 
initiated by the issuers or the shareholders. 
As is apparent, shareholder identification, alongside the rules 
on top-down and bottom-up transmission of information relevant to 
the exercise of shareholders’ rights along the investment chain (see 
Article 83-novies (1)(g-bis), Article 82 (4-bis) CLF, and 
implementing regulations), are clearly intended to support the 
exercise of shareholder rights as a policy goal.  Shareholder 
identification encourages engagement between a company’s 
investor relations department and its shareholders since it can 
improve communication with the shareholder base and allows the 
company to develop more targeted communication programs; the 
right granted to minorities to activate the identification process adds 
to shareholder active ownership since it favors non-activist 
institutional investor collective action—whether through voting, 
convening a general meeting, putting a new item on a meeting’s 
agenda, asking questions, etc., or simply by facilitating sharing 
views on agenda items, corporate action and governance, or gauging 
 
 
165 See Article 133-bis of Consob regulation No. 11971 (providing 
that cost allocation be regulated by each issuer in the articles of 
association; if the articles of association fail to do so, the costs of 
shareholder identification will be borne entirely by the issuer. However, if 
the shareholders make a request for shareholder identification in the six 
months following the end of the fiscal year, and in any case prior to the 
annual general meeting, and no identification request is made directly by 
the issuer in the same period of time, the company will fully incur the 
costs for disclosure of the shareholder identification data and the number 
of shares registered on the securities accounts). 
166 See Article 83-duodecies (4) CLF. 
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preferences, e.g. in view of an important and uncertain vote, and up 
to challenging the board or controlling shareholders. 
IV. THE PRACTICE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND 
ENGAGEMENT IN ITALY 
This section briefly follows up on the analysis above by 
reporting some evidence regarding the practice of shareholder 
voting and engagement in Italy.  We focus on say-on-pay and 
director elections through slate voting since these tools have proven 
to catalyze institutional investors’ preferences in the Italian context.  
A. SAY-ON-PAY VOTES 
Alongside enhanced attendance rates at shareholders 
meetings,167 increased institutional investor engagement with 
companies publicly listed in Italy can be quite clearly inferred from 
data concerning say-on-pay votes ever since first-time application 
of Article 123-ter (6) CLF in 2012, whose outcomes seem in line 
with those characterizing other Member States: altogether, for-votes 
prevail over against and withhold votes, with investors mostly 
tending to side with directors.168  However, against votes are all but 
 
 
167 See supra Part II. 
168 See Georgeson et al., FTSE MIB Proxy Season 2013, 34-41 
(2013), https://archivioceradi.luiss.it/files/2011/10/FTSE-MIB-2013-
Evoluzione-degli-assetti-proprietari-ed-attivismo-delle-minoranze.pdf, 
according to whom for say-on-pay votes averaged 88% of the voting 
capital in 2012 and 90% in 2013. See also Belcredi et al., supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 9, according to whom against and 
withhold votes averaged 5% in 2012. Such divergent findings are arguably 
attributable to the different width of sample issuers examined in the 
analyses (limited to FTSE MIB issuers in the first case; including all 226 
publicly listed companies in the second case). Hence, higher dissent levels 
found in the first study emphasize that non-national institutions tend to 
concentrate investments in blue chips. In both cases, consensus over 
remuneration policies was found to be only slightly higher than that 
observed in the United States and the UK, and in line with that found in 
other countries with higher levels of ownership concentration, such as 
Germany.  
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irrelevant, more so if ownership concentration is considered.169  
Where major stakeholder votes are left aside, consensus over 
remuneration at larger issuers averaged 57% of the votes in 2012 
and 67% in 2013.  Interestingly enough, against votes nonetheless 
accounted for more than 50% in 10 out of 32 FTSE MIB companies 
in 2013, chiefly as a consequence of foreign institutional investor 
votes.170  In fact, over the first years of say-on-pay application, 
increased attendance at shareholders meetings by foreign 
institutions has been found to positively correlate with both the size 
of investee firms and higher rates of against votes, with foreign 
institutions also seeming to drive the votes of domestic 
institutions.171  Hence, institutional investor scrutiny appears to be 
stronger at larger firms.172  In turn, the fact that dissent over 
remuneration policies negatively correlates with ownership 
concentration is generally explained by closer monitoring 
performed by controlling shareholders.173 
Where against votes were found to be a majority, this occurred 
under particular circumstances and within complex contexts, 
typically in situations where the firm was facing financial distress, 
suits were brought against corporate directors, or all directors 
resigned in the context of control contests.174  Out of such 
circumstances, higher dissent rates were typically found to be 
associated with unsatisfactory information in the remuneration 
policy proposed by the board, exceedingly generous compensation 
 
 
169 See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 18-19. 
170 See Georgeson et al., supra note 168168, at 35. 
171 See Belcredi et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
28-29, 32 (according to whom non-national institutions perform a dissent-
aggregation function vis-à-vis domestic investors). 
172 Id.at 25, 26, 28.  
173 Id. at 27-28. 
174 Id. at 22.  
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levels, especially in regard to CEO severance contracts or 
performance-based vesting conditions in equity grants.175  
Against and withhold say-on-pay votes by institutional 
investors have increased in 2018 to about 8% of the share capital 
and 41% of the total number of shares held by them.176  
Interestingly, since 2017, dissent has grown markedly at Italian blue 
chips, reversing the decreasing trend for FTSE MIB companies over 
the 2012-2016 period. 
Altogether, relative average say-on-pay consensus in Italy has 
been interpreted not as a measure of institutional investors’ 
unawareness and conformity in opinions, but as a confirmation of 
the efficacy of say-on-pay as a lever by which to promote higher 
levels of transparency concerning remuneration policies, as well as 
a signal for enhanced transparency177 achieved as a response to 
 
 
175 See id. at 27; see also Georgeson et al., supra note 168, at 41 
(stating that such findings are in line with those referred to the UK, where 
non-binding say-on-pay was introduced in 2002); see Fabrizio Ferri & 
David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence 
from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 529 (2013) (indicating that these very 
same reasons motivate negative voting recommendations issued by proxy 
advisors as well); see, e.g., Frontis Governance, Studio sulle 
remunerazioni nelle società quotate in Italia. Esercizio 2011 [A Study on 
2011 Remunerations at Publicly Listed Companies in Italy] 29 (2012), 
http://www.frontisgovernance.com.  
176 Consob, supra note 42, at 35 (noticing that institutional investors’ 
dissent appears to be lower at widely held companies and when 
institutional investors hold a major stake).  
177 See Frontis Governance, Studio sulle remunerazioni nelle società 
quotate in Italia. Esercizio 2012 [A Study on 2012 Remunerations at 
Publicly Listed Companies in Italy] 6 (2013), 
http://www.frontisgovernance.com/attachments/article/315/Studio%20Re
munerazioni%202012%20-%20Abstract.pdf. (discussing the key role 
played by transparency in regard to the value of say-on-pay votes); see 
Guido Ferrarini et al., Understanding Directors’ Pay in Europe: A 
Comparative and Empirical Analysis 14-15 (EGCI Law Working Paper 
126/2009, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418463.  
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increased shareholder oversight.178  Interestingly, proxy advisors 
have been found to have a remarkable impact on the outcome of say-
on-pay proposals, and a clear correlation has been found between 
negative proxy advisor recommendations and lower vote results.  In 
the 2019 proxy season, for instance, “in the FTSE MIB, the five 
remuneration reports with the lowest level of support all received a 
negative recommendation from the majority of the [most 
significant] proxy advisors.”179 
Further still, the (previously) non-binding nature of say-on-pay 
votes has not been found to reduce investors’ oversight incentive.  
Rather, precatory say-on-pay, even if well below a majority vote, 
has seemed to exert a disciplining effect on the remuneration 
committees within the board of directors, given that shareholder 
resolutions adopted with relatively high against and withhold votes 
signal  lack of trust with the directors and expose the board to 
adverse reputational effects.180  Therefore, say-on-pay can also serve 
to support fruitful shareholder-director dialogue as a form of 
engagement, quite the same way as so-called withhold or vote-no 
campaigns have proven to do in the United States.181  It remains to 
be seen whether, and if so how, the transition towards binding say-
on-pay votes will change investors’ attitude on investee companies’ 
compensation practices.182  When looking at binding say-on-pay 
 
 
178 See Ferri & Maber, supra note 175, at 530 (finding that say-on-
pay can have a disciplining effect in that it induces ex-ante changes in 
remuneration policies aimed at limiting votes: all in all) (“UK investors 
perceived say on pay to be a value enhancing monitoring mechanism and 
were successful in using say on pay votes to pressure firms to remove 
controversial pay practices and increase the sensitivity of pay to poor 
performance”).  
179 Georgeson, Georgeson’s 2019 Proxy Season Review 97 (2019), 
https://www.georgeson.com/it/2019-season-review. 
180 See Ferrarini et al., supra note 177,  at 17-18. 
181 See Ferri & Maber, supra note 175, at 531. 
182 Based on Article 7(2)(b) of Legislative Decree no 49/2019 
(transposing SRD II into national law), the updated version of Article 123-
ter CLF which includes binding say-on-pay on remuneration policies 
applies only starting from the 2020 proxy season. See D.L. 49/2019 (It.). 
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that was already in place at publicly listed banks and insurance 
companies, it should be noticed that comparatively lower levels of 
dissent have been regarded as motivating more responsible 
shareholder voting.183 
B. SLATE VOTING 
Beyond say-on-pay, director elections have become the main 
target of institutional investors, both domestic and foreign, at Italian 
listed companies.184  This is chiefly a consequence of the enactment 
of slate voting, on the one hand, and the record date regime for 
shareholder voting on the other.  Crucially, director elections at 
publicly listed companies feature a substantive convergence of 
foreign and domestic institutional investor votes on the slates 
submitted by Italian asset managers through Assogestioni, with 
institutional investors’ votes often coming quite close to the votes 
cast by the major stakeholders in the company. 
Even though slate voting was introduced earlier,185 until 2010, 
institutional investors were only able to appoint corporate board 
members within a small group of listed companies.186  As a matter 
of fact, Italian institutions concentrated the submission of slates of 
director nominees on a limited number of major issuers featuring 
better relative performance and better corporate governance, as well 
 
 
183 See Belcredi et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
32. 
184 See Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini, The European 
Corporate Governance Framework: Issues and Perspectives 47 (ECGI 
Law Working Paper no. 214/2013, 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264990. Such 
finding is in line with the wider European context. See Mallin, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 192 (reporting that resolutions in most 
EU countries show “a clear emphasis being placed on board composition 
and the appointment of directors to the board”).  
185 See supra Part III.C.3. 
186 Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 19–20. 
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as on longer-term investee companies.187  However, since 2010, 
following the introduction of the record date system,188 participation 
by institutional investors in voting at board elections has increased 
significantly and, over the years, a growing number of directors and 
statutory auditors have been elected by institutional investors.189  
Moreover, several bylaws, especially at larger corporations, have 
actually made room for two or three minority-appointed directors, 
and the average number of directors appointed by minorities is 
approximately two.190  Currently, 100 out of 232 listed companies’ 
boards include at least one minority-appointed director.191  
Minority-appointed directors represent, on average, 17% of the 
members of the boards where they are present.192  At the same time, 
the boards of statutory auditors at 112 listed companies include at 
least one minority-appointed member.193  
As mentioned above, owing to the enabling role played by 
Assogestioni in the process of selecting director nominees, a 
significant proportion of minority-elected directors have been 
picked from the lists coordinated by the Association.  In 2019, sixty-
four slates of director nominees were submitted to the vote by 
minority institutions, appointing seventy-six candidates in forty-
 
 
187 Such finding further suggested that institutions might have wished 
to concentrate engagement efforts on a small number of major firms also 
due to “political” and lobbying intents. See Belcredi & Enriques, supra 
note 63, at 20 and 30; Belcredi et al., supra note 144, at 414. 
188 See supra Part III.C.5. 
189 Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 21. 
190 Piergaetano Marchetti et al., Dissenting Directors, 18 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 659 (2017). 
191 Assonime, La Corporate Governance in Italia: Autodisciplina, 
Remunerazioni e Comply-or-Explain’ [Corporate governance in Italy: Soft 
law, remunerations and comply-or-explain] 37 (2019), 
http://www.assonime.it/attivita-editoriale/studi/Pagine/note-e-studi-1-
2019.aspx; CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note 17, at 17. 
192 CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note 17, at 17. 
193 Id. 
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nine listed companies.194  It should be noticed that, although the 
shareholdings of the Italian institutional investors that formally 
submit the lists do not exceed, on average, 3.5% of the votes cast, 
the lists promoted by Assogestioni are able to catalyze the votes of 
a sizeable number of Italian and foreign fellow institutional 
investors, so that minority slates frequently end up receiving more 
than 30%—and sometimes around 50%—of the votes cast.195  Given 
the decreasing weight of Italian mutual funds in the Italian stock 
market, the support of foreign institutional investors has proven to 
be essential in this respect. 
Altogether, collective engagement promoted by Assogestioni 
with a view to board elections can be seen as a fairly effective tool 
for monitoring investee companies; minority-appointed independent 
directors within the board can favor some form of oversight within 
the board itself, given that such directors are primarily expected to 
protect minority interests, also by enhancing board disclosure.196  
V. HEDGE FUND-DRIVEN ACTIVISM AND ENGAGEMENT 
While the Italian corporate governance framework is mainly 
meant to empower non-activist institutional investors, one 
noticeable factor that has been shaping institutional investor 
ownership in Italy over the very last few years is the growing 
relevance of activist hedge fund intervention.  Interestingly, after the 
United States, activism among large economies is “relatively most 
frequent in Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland (in 
declining order), none of which are typically labeled as having 
 
 
194 ASSOGESTIONI, STAGIONE ASSEMBLEARE 2019 [2019 Proxy 




196 See, e.g., Moscariello et al., supra note 127, at 165 (finding a 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent minority 
directors and firm value); Piergaetano Marchetti et al., supra note 190, at 
659 (finding that minority-appointed directors are more likely to dissent 
than directors appointed with a majority of the votes). 
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active markets for corporate control.”197  Further still, in relative 
terms, activism is “less frequent [in the United States and the UK] 
after adjusting for the number of listed companies than in Italy or 
Germany.”198  In Italy, indeed, hedge funds have “taken position in 
a great variety of listed companies regardless of the presence of 
controlling shareholders.”199  Such findings may be surprising at 
first sight, given that controlled companies predominate within the 
Italian corporate landscape.  The truth is, however, that minority-
empowering shareholder rights, particularly the right to appoint 
directors on the board, coupled with mainstream institutional voting 
support to activist proposals,200 can be the drivers of activist 
intervention at controlled companies which feature a significant 
proportion of institutional investors in the shareholder base, 
especially where de facto control is in place, as they indeed have 
proven to be in the Italian context.  The presence of U.S. institutional 
investors in the shareholder base seems to provide further support 
 
 
197 Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2940 (2017). 
198 Id. 
199 Erede, supra note 161, at 354 (further noting that “differences in 
the ownership structure of the target companies also seem to have had no 
impact on activists’ investment choices”: Ibid 358). See also Belcredi & 
Enriques, supra note 63, at 20–22, 31 (noticing the rise, in recent years, of 
hedge funds successfully resorting to legal tools and remedies made 
available by reforms in the last two decades to aggressively target listed 
companies engaging in controversial transactions); Elisabetta Bellini, 
Hedge Fund Activism in Italy, 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 201, 231, 233 (2009). 
200 See, e.g., J.P. Morgan, The activist revolution. Understanding and 
navigating a new world of heightened investor scrutiny 8 (2015), 
https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320693986586.pdf, (emphasizing 
that “[n]o other factor has had as significant an impact on the success of 
shareholder activism as the changing attitude and behavior of traditional 
long-only investors: public pension funds, institutional investors and 
money managers.”). 
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for activism.  In effect, U.S. institutional investors exert significant 
influence on the level of activism in non-U.S. countries.201 
Against this backdrop, while the increase in the presence of 
activist investors on the Italian capital markets can further 
incentivize mainstream institutions’ active conduct, it may also, to 
some extent, influence the role played by non-activist institutional 
investors in Italy.  Due to their different incentive structures, activist 
investors are more willing than mainstream institutions to engage in 
costly, and often confrontational, initiatives aimed at bringing about 
a change in the target company's policies or management.  Hence, 
even non-activist institutional investors might be willing to support 
activist intervention in spite of the collaborative and constructivist 
stance for shareholder engagement adopted by Italian legislature and 
soft law principles.  Put differently, the rise in activists’ 
interventions could lead to the diffusion of an engagement approach 
quite different from that which EU and Italian law aims to stimulate.  
One illustrative example concerns the 2018 battle for control of 
Telecom Italia between Vivendi and Elliott Advisors, showing that 
this form of “cooperation” between activist and mainstream 
institutional investors can enhance the relevance of activist-driven 
initiatives and lead to a more confrontational model of engagement 
in Italy.  In the Telecom Italia case, indeed, the majority of 
mainstream institutional investors decided to side with Elliott 
Advisors and the cooperation between activist and non-activist 
institutional investors helped Elliott Advisors to appoint ten out of 
fifteen members on the board at Telecom Italia.202  In effect, 
 
 
201 See Becht et al., supra note 197, at 2968–69 (noticing that “[t]he 
increase and spread of U.S. foreign institutional holdings has significantly 
contributed to hedge fund activism becoming a global phenomenon”).  
202 Whether the diffusion of such initiatives can be beneficial for the 
Italian capital markets is difficult to predict, as the potential effects of 
increased shareholder activism also depend, to a certain extent, on the 
ownership structure of target companies. See Gaia Balp, Activist 
Shareholders at De Facto Controlled Companies, in 13 Brooklyn J. Corp. 
Fin. & Com. L. 348 (2019) (noting that, as far as de facto controlled 
companies are concerned, “an activist's power to exert substantial 
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enhanced institutional investor participation at shareholders 
meetings renders voting outcomes more difficult to predict, even in 
contexts of concentrated ownership.  This in turn can increase the 
potential for successful activist intervention.  At de facto controlled 
companies, where corporate control is contestable, this might 
especially be the case where shareholder slates are submitted to be 
voted on at director elections, proxy fights occur, or the general 
meeting is to vote on material related party transactions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The case of Italy quite clearly shows that institutional investors 
can play a major role within contexts of concentrated corporate 
ownership, and that legislature can greatly contribute to favoring 
institutions’ active ownership by creating a friendly regulatory 
environment.  Indeed, despite high levels of ownership 
concentration of publicly listed companies, institutional investors 
have grown into prominent players on the Italian corporate 
governance scene.  Different factors, both economic and regulatory, 
contributed to bringing about such outcome.  Within a context 
dominated by the principal-principal agency problem, regulatory 
action taken over time has been one strongly shaped around 
empowering minority shareholders, whether by enhancing minority 
shareholder rights or supporting minorities’ actual ability and 
willingness to exercise shareholder rights.  Moreover, 
intermediaries’ regulation has focused on institutional investors and 
asset managers as owners and has enhanced their oversight role, 
especially as to voting obligations.  Coupled with support provided 
by self-regulation, particularly the Italian Stewardship Principles, 
these factors have driven institutional investors to become more 




influence over the company's management premised on a small equity 
stake, coupled with the presence of a much larger, but (theoretically) 
disempowered, blockholder is likely to cause instability at the corporate-
governance level”). 
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Particularly, say-on-pay votes, enhanced shareholder oversight 
of related party transactions, and slate voting for director elections, 
alongside the pivotal effect of the record date regime on boosting 
institutions’ participation in the shareholders meeting, have proven 
most successful at driving increased institutional investor 
engagement with Italian listed companies.  Moreover, say-on-pay 
votes, related party transaction oversight, and slate voting have 
proven to mutually combine in the Italian practice of shareholder 
engagement.  First, say-on-pay is a tool complimentary for minority 
representation on the board of directors to foster institutional 
investor stewardship.  In fact, the presence of minority-elected 
directors within the board’s remuneration committee has been found 
to positively correlate with increased institutional investor 
participation in the shareholder meetings, and higher levels of 
transparency concerning the remuneration policies were quite often 
achieved as a response to relevant against and withhold say-on-pay 
votes.  Second, minority board representation ensured by slate 
voting can improve self-dealing oversight since ex ante independent 
scrutiny of related party transactions is required.  Additionally, at 
Italian listed companies, the presence of minority elected directors 
has actually had a positive impact on the adequacy of internal 
procedures for addressing related-party transactions. 
On the other hand, Italian experience with director elections 
through slate voting suggests that coordinated engagements by 
institutional investors can have a positive impact on investee 
companies.  The Italian Stewardship Principles emphasize the 
relevance of collective engagements, and Assogestioni, the Italian 
non-profit asset manager association, greatly contributed to 
developing a peculiar pathway for collective engagements which 
leverages slate voting to catalyze investors’ stewardship efforts.  By 
redistributing engagement-associated costs among the affiliated 
investors, Assogestioni promotes shareholder collaboration within a 
formalized framework for the selection of candidates and the 
submission of short lists of director nominees as a tool for 
shareholder monitoring.  As a matter of fact, slate voting, subsidized 
by the proactive role played by Assogestioni as an enabling entity 
and combined with the incentivizing effect of the record date 
system, has proven to be a fundamental lever by which to support 
mainstream institutional investors’ collective action as a viable and 
cost-effective pathway for engaging and monitoring investee 
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companies in Italy.  An ever-growing number of directors and 
statutory auditors are actually elected by institutional investors. 
 
